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In this Article, Professor Janis argues that modern enthusiasm for
large-scale legislative reforms in patent law should be received with
caution in view of the history of patent law reform. That history suggests
that patent law is more resilient—or perhaps more impervious to
change—than modern reformers recognize. To explore these propositions, Professor Janis analyzes the history of the mid-Victorian era British patent abolitionism movement. He demonstrates that much of the reform dialogue of that era, from the elucidation of major problems in the
patent system, to the formulation of legislative solutions, mirrors quite
closely the modern U.S. patent reform debate. He asserts that participants
in the modern patent law reform debate should take this history to heart,
approaching age-old proposals for large-scale legislative reform with
healthy skepticism.

I.

INTRODUCTION
Patent reform . . . was unimportant, esoteric and dull. It was a
subject for the hard-headed enthusiast, and demanded unfaltering
attention rather than sparkling rhetoric.1

“Esoteric?” Undoubtedly. “Dull?” No comment. But, “unimportant?”
Not! Today, everyone wants to be a patent law reformer. I give you Bezos.2 Nader.3 Gore.4 Oprah.5
© 2002 Mark D. Janis
† Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. Thanks to Mark Lemley
and the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, and to Dan Burk, Justin Hughes, and
Rob Merges for helpful comments. Rob Hodgson and Gary Quick provided excellent
research assistance.
1. H.I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750-1852, at 57 (1984) (describing mid-nineteenth century British patent law reform).
2. See, e.g., Scott Thurm, Amazon.com Chief Executive Urges Shorter Duration for
Internet Patents, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2000, at B3 (reporting on Bezos’ suggestions in
his open letter on the Amazon.com website, which advocated term reduction for software
patents, pre-grant oppositions, and other reforms).
3. See, e.g., Consumer Project on Technology, at http://www.cptech.org/ (last visited Jan.9, 2002).
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Alas for Bezos and his fellow luminaries—patent law reform remains
a subject for hard-headed enthusiasts. Patent law has a long and complex
history. Even patent law reform has a long history, and modern patent law
reform efforts can benefit by taking careful account of that history. This
Article examines one curious historical episode—the short-lived movement for patent abolition—and analyzes whether the history of this most
radical of reforms can teach us anything about more temperate reforms of
the modern patent system.
Nowadays, it is hard to find any rock-ribbed, dyed-in-the-wool patent
abolitionists. Indeed, it is hard to find any patent abolitionists at all.
Contemporary patent policy debates seem invariably to start from the
premise that the patent system is a fait accompli.6 Even Fritz Machlup,
who declared that he could not justify instituting a new patent system on
economic grounds, allowed grudgingly that he would consider it
irresponsible to abolish patent systems that had long existed.7 Likewise,
scholars such as Shavell and Van Ypersele, who have studied the
economics of reward systems, tend to offer them as adjuncts to, not
replacements for, the patent system.8
In truth, there never were very many patent abolitionists. In the United
States, no substantial patent abolitionist movement has ever emerged, although there were some late-nineteenth century commentators who
warned that “the people might rise in their wrath” against the patent sys4. Meaning Al. See Douglas Kiker, Gore Proposes Generic Drug Plan, AP
ONLINE, Nov. 8, 1999, available at 1999 WL 28136946 (reporting that at a campaign
stop at a pharmacy, candidate Gore remarked that “[p]atents are great” but that “unfair
patent extensions” resulted in higher consumer prices for pharmaceuticals, a problem that
should be addressed by new legislation). For patent issues concerning the other Gore, see
W.L. Gore & Associates v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983), addressing
patents relating to Gore-Tex technology.
5. Actually, I’m not entirely sure about Oprah.
6. For a rare counterexample, see Brian Peckham, Should the U.S. Patent Laws Be
Abolished?, 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 389 (1985) (analyzing seriously, but largely rejecting,
abolitionist arguments).
7. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
(Comm. Print 1958) (Fritz Machlup, author). Machlup asserted that:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long
time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge,
to recommend abolishing it.
Id. at 80.
8. See generally Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001).
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tem,9 others who feared imminent Congressional action,10 and still others
who thought that the Supreme Court was poised to take care of the job
through “judicial legislation.”11 As experience has demonstrated, reports
of the death of the U.S. patent system have always been greatly exaggerated. Even claims that the system is in mortal “distress” seem quaint in the
current environment.12
Victorian England, however, did have patent abolitionists, and they cut
a wide swath. The movement, however, was short lived. Serious debate
over whether to abolish the British patent system extended for several
years in the mid-nineteenth century. The British patent system emerged
from this ordeal unchanged in some respects and fundamentally modernized in others.
This Article explores the relevance to modern U.S. patent law of the
nineteenth century patent abolitionism movement in England. This connection is significant, although it may not immediately be apparent due to
material differences between the British patent system of the early and
middle nineteenth century—the “unreformed” patent system13—and the
9. D.J. Brewer, The Patent System, 3 YALE L.J. 149, 157 (1894) (expressing “the
strong conviction that unless some radical changes are made in the patent system as it
exists to-day it will not be many years before the people rise in their wrath and abolish it
altogether.”).
10. See, e.g., Chauncey Smith, A Century of Patent Law, 5 Q. J. ECON. 44 (Oct.
1890). Smith states:
It is undeniable that there has been, and doubtless still is in some parts
of the country, a wide-spread hostility to the patent law. . . . The writer
was assured several years ago . . . that a large number of the members
of the House of Representatives were ready at any moment to vote for
the repeal of the patent law. At every session of Congress bills are introduced, providing, if not for the repeal of the law, at least for its
amendment in such a way as to destroy or impair the value of patent
property.
Id. at 58-59.
11. Avery v. Ever Ready Label Corp., 104 F. Supp. 913, 914 (D.N.J. 1952) (reporting the views of some observers that the Supreme Court, in the course of its midtwentieth century patent jurisprudence, “has deviated from well-established doctrines of
patent law and may soon abolish the patent system by judicial legislation”).
12. See Abe Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 810
(1971); see also Mark D. Janis, The Revival of Distress in the Patent System (forthcoming
2002) (on file with author) (positing that the patent system endures cycles of under protection and overprotection, and accompanying cycles of distress and exuberance); cf.
Lawrence G. Kastriner, The Revival of Confidence in the Patent System, 73 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5 (1991).
13. KLAUS BOEHM, I THE BRITISH PATENT SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATION 19-26 (1967)
(referring to the “unreformed patent system” as subsisting until the passage of the 1852
Patents Act, or roughly between 1750 and 1850). Relevant statutes during this period
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modern U.S. system. The British patent system of the time was a registration system.14 Until 1852, the system lacked any central granting authority,15 and even afterward, the Patent Office conducted no substantive patentability examination until reforms were enacted in the 1880’s. Patent
applicants were subject to pre-grant oppositions,16 and prior to 1852, previously-filed caveats as well.17

include patents acts of 1835, 1839, and 1852. See Patents Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 83
(Eng.); Patents Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 67 (Eng.); Patents Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., c.
83 (Eng.), reprinted in JOHN CORYTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LETTERS-PATENT,
FOR THE SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND 275, 279, 294 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1855) (reproducing the text of the
1835, 1839, and 1852 Acts).
For a study of the origins of the British patent system and its history through the
eighteenth century, see generally CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM 1660-1800 (1988).
14. That is, the system included no provisions for substantive pre-grant examination.
By contrast, after a relatively brief experiment with a patent registration system, the U.S.
abandoned it in 1836 in favor of pre-grant examination. See generally EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION 1798-1836 (1998).
One key point in debates over reform of the British patent system in 1850-51
was whether to institute pre-grant examination. Thomas Webster, one of the proponents
of this position, pointed with approval to the U.S. system in arguing for pre-grant
examination. See MOUREEN COULTER, PROPERTY IN IDEAS: THE PATENT QUESTION IN
MID-VICTORIAN BRITAIN 57 (1991). It is remarkable that even as early as the midnineteenth century, U.S. patent law was beginning to influence the course of British
patent law, even though U.S. patent law had come into formal existence only a few
decades before, borrowing from British law and antecedents.
For more on Thomas Webster’s positions in the patent reform and abolition debate, see infra Part II.
15. Instead, applicants were required to negotiate an almost impossibly complicated
journey through multiple government offices. See infra notes 24-45 and accompanying
text.
16. See W.M. HINDMARCH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO PATENT PRIVILEGES FOR THE SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS 377 (London, V. & R. Stevens 1846) (describing the relatively restrictive pre-1852 opposition practice); THOMAS WEBSTER, THE NEW
PATENT LAW: ITS HISTORY, OBJECTS, AND PROVISIONS 25-26 (4th ed. 1854), microformed on 19th-Century Legal Treatises, Fiche 39,017 (Research Publications Int’l) (describing 1852 Act provisions authorizing “advertisement” of specifications and providing
an opportunity for pre-grant opposition by interested members of the public); see also id.
at 8 (explaining that the 1852 Act also incorporated a notion of provisional rights “thus
affording a precedent for the principle that the legal right should date from the day of the
application, unless justice to other parties required that it should be post-dated”).
17. HINDMARCH, supra note 16, at 504-05 (explaining that a caveat was a filing expressing an inventor’s intent later to file a patent application and petitioning that no patent be granted on the invention without notice to the caveat filer); see also WEBSTER,
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Not surprisingly, British patents of the time afforded relatively insecure rights.18 In addition to being subject to invalidity defenses in infringement actions,19 British patentees could be made defendants in scire
facias actions, a remedy for the public and the Crown against defective
patents.20 Moreover, prior to 1852, British patentees could obtain an injunction against patent infringement only via a separate action at equity in
the Chancery Court, and the Court ordinarily required that infringement of
valid rights be established in a prior proceeding at the law courts.21 Surprisingly, despite these important differences, much of the core agenda
that motivated nineteenth century British patent law reform and abolitionist movements has carried over to U.S. patent law reform agendas of both
the twentieth and, now, the twenty-first centuries. Patent abolitionism may
help give historical context for current patent reform efforts. It may also
yield lessons about the process of patent law reform, and, more generally,
about the political economy of patent systems old and new.
Part II considers reform initiatives in early nineteenth century British
patent law that preceded the mid-Victorian abolitionist movement. Part III
turns to the abolitionist movement itself, focusing on several aspects of
that movement that are pertinent to modern patent reform discussions. Part
IV offers some conclusions about the process of patent law reform, including a cautionary observation about the absence of evolution in patent reform agendas over the past century.

supra note 16, at 25 (noting with approval that the 1852 Act abolished the caveat practice).
18. Those rights included basic exclusive rights in making, using, and selling the
patented invention for a 14-year term measured from the date of sealing. HINDMARCH,
supra note 16, at 53-55 (exclusive rights); id. at 144 (term).
19. Id. at 262.
20. Id. at 376-430 (describing scire facias actions in detail). Scire facias actions
might be likened to declaratory judgment actions in form, but scire facias actions were
not constrained by jurisdictional limitations that characterize modern declaratory judgment actions. Accordingly, they could readily be used to harass patentees. In response, a
“Patentees’ Association” formed in the late 1700’s to resist “opulent manufacturers” who
“have agreed to use very beneficial patent inventions [without authorization] and have
subscribed large sums to attack the same by writ of Scire facias.” DUTTON, supra note 1,
at 37 (citing an anonymous circular found in the correspondence of James Watt). Evidently, James Watt was unimpressed with this early version of a patent owners’ lobby,
calling the Patentees’ Association a motley crew of “projectors and madmen, some of
which I thought it a disgrace to keep company.” See id.
21. For a description of the 1852 reform of this practice, see WEBSTER, supra note
16, at 36 (explaining that section 42 of the 1852 Act gave courts at common law the
power to grant injunctions and an accounting in the case of infringement).
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II.

PRECURSORS TO ABOLITIONISM: ADMINISTRATIVE
REFORM AND THE “HEROIC INVENTOR” MOTIF

A.

The Letters of “Vindicator”



Beginning in 1828, the London Journal of Arts and Sciences published
a series of letters whose author, in the style of the times, identified himself
by a pseudonym, “Vindicator.” Vindicator took on the British patent administration, which he excoriated, in characteristically unsparing rhetoric,
as a system of “rank absurdity, oppression, and humbug.”22 Vindicator
portrayed the formal prerequisites for obtaining patent protection and the
fees accompanying each step in excruciating detail. According to Vindicator, the procedures amounted to a “heterogeneous mass of antiquated pretensions—of fantastic operations—of absurd practices—and of legal impositions,” which were “retained for the sole advantage of a few State officers and subalterns, in defiance of common sense, of common honesty,
and of the universal feeling of society.”23
Vindicator’s portrayal was not far off the mark. British patent administration in the first half of the nineteenth century was truly Byzantine.
Hindmarch, a barrister and patent treatise author,24 described the procedures in a single sentence of alarming proportions:
[A] petition for the patent, verified by a solemn declaration, and
left at the Home Office; a reference of the petition by the Secretary of State to the Attorney or Solicitor General; a report by one
of those officers to the Crown in favour of the grant; a warrant
under the sign manual to the Attorney or Solicitor General to
prepare a bill for the patent; the preparation of the bill and two
22. Letter XIII, On the Chancery Fees and Charges upon Patents for Inventions, 3
LONDON J. ARTS & SCI. 1-8 (1829), reprinted in JEREMY PHILLIPS, CHARLES DICKENS
AND THE ‘POOR MAN’S TALE OF A PATENT’ app. D, at 47 (1984). Phillips speculates that
Vindicator was probably William Newton, editor of the London Journal of Arts & Sciences and a leading expert on the British patent system. Id. at 9.
By no means was Vindicator the first agitator for patent law reform in the British patent system. For example, in the late eighteenth century, preeminent inventor James
Watt made a variety of proposals for refinements to the patent law. See Eric Robinson,
James Watt and the Law of Patents, 13 TECH. & CULTURE 115 (1972); see also BOEHM,
supra note 13, at 26-27 (remarking on Watt’s activities and noting that patent reform bills
were introduced, without success, in 1793, 1819-1822, 1826, and 1833); DUTTON, supra
note 1, at 39-40 (discussing Watt’s proposals to maintain specifications in secrecy and to
have them examined to ensure that they were sufficiently comprehensible).
23. Letter XVI, On the Fees and Charges upon Chancery Patents for Inventions, 3
LONDON J. ARTS & SCI. 175-80 (1829), reprinted in JEREMY PHILLIPS, CHARLES DICKENS AND THE ‘POOR MAN’S TALE OF A PATENT’ app. D, at 51 (1984).
24. See HINDMARCH, supra note 16.
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transcripts or copies of it in the Attorney General’s Office, called
the Patent Bill Office; the conversion of one of these copies of
the bill into the Queen’s Bill, upon its receiving the sign manual;
the first bill being deposited in the Signet Office, a second copy
is transformed into the Signet Bill by adding a few formal words
to it, and sealing it with the seal of the Secretary of State; the
Signet Bill being received in the Privy Seal Office, the remaining
copy of the bill is in a similar manner converted into the Privy
Seal Bill; the Privy Seal Bill is then delivered to the Lord Chancellor, and a patent made in the form contained in the bill.25

Effectively, the patent applicant had to set in motion a chain of command that commenced with the Queen and proceeded through a wilderness of bureaucracy. While this may appear to modern sensibilities as an
early example of bureaucracies expanding to fill every void, Hindmarch
suggested that this “cumbrous machinery” was probably the product of
deliberate policy tracing back to the sixteenth century.26 During the reign
of Henry VIII, it was considered important to limit the power to confer
valuable grants in any individual officer of the Crown. Coke had explained
as much in his “Institutes:”
[S]uch was the wisdom of prudent antiquity, that whatsoever
should passe the Great Seale should come through so many
hands, to the end that nothing should passe that Great Seale, that
is so highly esteemed and accounted of in law, that as against
law or inconvenient; or that anything should passe from the king
anywayes, which he intended not, by undue or surreptitious
meanes.27

Even applicants who succeeded in navigating this formidable bureaucratic maze attained patent protection of dubious value, at best, because at
no stage in these extraordinarily cumbersome procedures did British patent authorities ever conduct a substantive examination of patentability.28
In addition to being subjected to potential pre-grant oppositions, an inventor might have his granted patent attacked in the courts on a writ of scire
25. W.M. HINDMARCH, OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEFECTS OF THE PATENT LAWS OF
THIS COUNTRY; WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR THE REFORM OF THEM 2 (Philadelphia, T. &
J.W. Johnson 1851).
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id. (quoting EDWARD COKE, 2 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 555 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (Articuli super chartas)). The policy, as relevant to the
patent grant, was embodied in a statute popularly known as the 1536 Clerks Act, 27 Hen.
VIII. c. 11 (1535).
28. See supra note 14.
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facias, or by invalidity challenges offered as defenses in infringement proceedings.29
Vindicator had put out a call for dramatic reform. Asserting that
“[m]en of skill, intellect, sense, learning, and nerve, are in decided opposition to all attempts to bolster up this most rotten part of a decaying order
of things,” he urged “public meetings, to petition Parliament for an effectual revision of patent laws and practice, and the adoption of an entire new
system of protection to inventions.”30
Vindicator enjoyed partial vindication, eventually. In 1829, Parliament
appointed a Select Committee of the House of Commons to review the
patent system,31 eventually leading to the passage of the 1835 Patents
Act32—by all accounts a “timid measure” making no major reforms.33 In
1851, Hindmarch’s work identified many of the same defects about which
Vindicator had so vociferously complained: bewildering and burdensome
procedures, delay, and stifling costs.34 Not until the 1852 Act did Britain
finally discard its archaic procedures and reduce application filing costs.35
But even the 1852 Act left much to be accomplished.36
The complaints of early British patent reformers demonstrate that dissatisfaction with patent administration—patent acquisition procedures,
29. See HINDMARCH, supra note 16, at 376-431 (explaining the scire facias action
and pre-grant opposition practice under nineteenth century British practice).
30. Letter XIII, supra note 22, at 47.
31. COULTER, supra note 14, at 44 (referring to the 1829 Committee).
32. Patents Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 83 (Eng.).
33. BOEHM, supra note 13, at 27; see also WEBSTER, supra note 16, at 3.
34. As to the last, see HINDMARCH, supra note 25, at 11, which claims that “[t]he
enormous sums which inventors must pay to obtain patents for their inventions, form one
of the greatest grievances of which they have to complain.” Hindmarch called for a series
of reforms ranging from the inclusion of foreign publications as prior art, to granting
third parties the right to a hearing in pre-grant oppositions, to requiring a printed specification and “some clear or distinct claim or claims of invention,” to, perhaps most importantly, that “[a]ll the present preliminary proceedings for obtaining patents to be abolished.” See id. at 54-57.
35. BOEHM, supra note 13, at 28-29 (reducing the filing fee to 25 pounds, compared
to the 300 pounds that Old John would have paid for comparable U.K. protection).
36. The 1852 Act did not institute substantive pre-grant examination, and despite
centralizing patent operations in a Patent Office, apparently did not provide adequate
administrative oversight, as made evident when large amounts of Patent Office funds
were unaccounted for in 1864. Id.; see also WEBSTER, supra note 16, at 42-48 (detailing
numerous shortcomings remaining in the 1852 Act).
On the other hand, the “cardinal features” of the 1852 Act included: (1) protection from the day of application; (2) one patent for the United Kingdom; (3) moderate
cost; (4) printing and publication of specifications; and (5) one office of patents and
specifications. Id. at 41.
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fees,37 and the extent of public participation in the process38—is by no
means a new theme in patent reform debates. This alone should serve as a
sobering reminder to students of twenty-first century patent policy that
much of what we say about reforming patent administration has probably
been said before, and many of the solutions that we propose have been
proposed, and probably previously discarded, though the social, economic,
and legal contexts have varied.
The tepid legislative response that greeted early nineteenth century
British patent reform efforts may also provide an important lesson about
the patent reform process in general. One might infer that then, as now,
abstract expressions of moral umbrage over the arcana of patent
administration are not likely to arouse the sympathies of politicians—at
least, not very quickly. Eventually, however, patent reform, and even
patent abolition, did gain a foothold in the British legislative agenda.
B.

Origins of the “Heroic Inventor” Motif

One important reason why British legislators ultimately took interest
in patent reform is the emergence of what might be designated the “heroic
inventor” motif. Charles Dickens was one of its chief progenitors. In 1850,
Dickens published a short work entitled A Poor Man’s Tale of a Patent.39
A Poor Man’s Tale is a narrative in the first person, told by the fictional
“Old John.” By his own modest representation, Old John was a man “of an
ingenious turn.”40 He spins a classic tale of invention:
I have been twenty year, off and on, completing an Invention,
and perfecting it. I perfected of it, last Christmas Eve at ten
o’clock at night. Me and my wife stood and let some tears fall
over the Model, when it was done and I brought her in to take a
37. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., PATENT OFFICE FEES—A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1-3 (Comm. Print 1958) (Victor L. Edwards, author) (describing
the fee structure under the patent acts of 1790, 1793, 1836, 1861, and recommendations
in 1912); id. at 3-8 (describing the fee changes in 1922, 1927, and 1930); id. at 8-16 (describing various attempts to change fees from 1947 through 1957).
For more recent sample commentary, see Michael N. Meller, Planning for a
Global Patent System, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 379, 380 (1998), and Erwin
F. Berrier, Jr., Global Patent Costs Must Be Reduced, 36 IDEA 473 (1996).
38. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1997) (commenting on newer proposals and tracing the history of legislative efforts to enact postgrant revocation procedures).
39. See PHILLIPS, supra note 22, at 15-21 (full reprint of Dickens’ work).
40. Old John remarks that he hopes “[i]t won’t be took as boastful in me, if I make
the remark . . . that I have always been of an ingenious turn.” Id. at 16.
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look at it. . . .There it was, perfected of, on Christmas Eve. . . at
ten o’clock at night. All the money I could spare I had laid out
upon the Model; and when times was bad, or my daughter Charlotte’s children sickly, or both, it had stood still, months at a
spell. I had pulled it to pieces, and made it over again with improvements, I don’t know how often. There it stood, at last, a
perfected Model as aforesaid.41

Old John’s troubles begin when he resolves to seek patent protection
for his invention. Drawing on his savings,42 Old John takes lodgings with
Thomas Joy, an acquaintance in London, and proceeds on an epic journey
through the British patent administration. In one memorable passage, he
summarizes his odyssey in tones reminiscent of Vindicator:
Look at the Home Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Patent
Office, the Engrossing Clerk, the Lord Chancellor, the Privy
Seal, the Clerk of the Patents, the Lord Chancellor’s Pursebearer, the Clerk of the Hanaper, the Deputy Clerk of the Hanaper, the Deputy Sealer, and the Deputy Chaff-Wax. No man in
England could get a Patent for an Indian-rubber band, or an ironhoop, without feeing all of them. Some of them, over and over
again. I went through thirty-five stages. I began with the Queen
upon the Throne. I ended with the Deputy Chaff-wax.43

Old John ultimately succeeds in receiving his patent, but only after exhausting nearly all of his savings.44 Obviously, Dickens’ Poor Man’s Tale
is a direct, satirical commentary on the complexity and cost of the patentgranting procedures under pre-1852 British practices. Reforms under the
1852 Act followed shortly on the heels of the publication of the Poor
Man’s Tale,45 and it is safe to assume that Dickens’ work had some small
influence.
For modern U.S. patent reform discussions, however, Dickens’ work
may be of interest for quite different reasons. A Poor Man’s Tale is one of
41. Id. at 16-17.
42. Specifically, his “legacy of one hundred and twenty-eight pound ten.” PHILLIPS,
supra note 22, at 17. Says Old John, “[m]e and my wife never broke into that money yet.
Note. We might come to be old and past our work. We now agreed . . . to make a hole in
it—I mean in the aforesaid money—and Patent the invention.” Id.
43. PHILLIPS, supra note 22, at 20-21. Phillips speculates that Dickens may have
been influenced, at least indirectly, by the Vindicator letters. Id. at 8-9.
44. “I was quite wore out, patience and pocket . . . I had lodged at Thomas Joy’s
over six weeks, and the unopposed patent for my invention, for England only, had cost
me ninety-six pound, seven, and eightpence. If I had taken it out for the United Kingdom,
it would have cost me more than three hundred pound.” Id. at 19-20.
45. See generally WEBSTER, supra note 16 (explaining the reforms in the 1852 Act).
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the earliest examples in Anglo-American patent law of invoking the now
familiar motif of the heroic inventor. Dickens spends a good deal of A
Poor Man’s Tale constructing a romantic image of the independent inventor, from the tears over the prototype on Christmas Eve, to the plundering
of the retirement savings to the persistence in the face of an unyielding
bureaucracy. Towards the close of the Tale, Dickens makes a direct appeal
to the inventor-as-hero, when Old John laments:
Is it reasonable to make a man feel as if, in inventing an ingenious improvement meant to do good, he had done something
wrong? How else can a man feel, when he is met by such difficulties at every turn? All inventors taking out a Patent MUST
feel so . . . .46

Although Dickens was peculiarly effective in idealizing inventors and
the process of invention, he was not alone. Similar imagery appears elsewhere in nineteenth century patent reform literature, albeit with less emotional impact.47
C.

The “Heroic Inventor” in U.S. Patent Law Iconography

The invocation of the heroic inventor in the cause of patent reform is
intriguing because today, one hundred and fifty years later, the heroic inventor remains firmly entrenched in the modern U.S. patent law iconogra46. PHILLIPS, supra note 22, at 20.
47. For example, in arguing against excessive filing fees in his 1851 volume on patent law reform, Hindmarch observes:
This enormous cost of patents throws very many serious difficulties in
the way of inventors. Such persons are seldom affluent, but on the contrary are generally in straitened circumstances, frequently very poor.
Many intelligent workmen are possessed of very considerable inventive
powers; but being unable to pay the cost of a patent for anything they
may invent, they have no motive to turn aside out of the beaten track.
HINDMARCH, supra note 25, at 12-13.
In tones that must surely resonate with contemporary high technology entrepreneurs, Hindmarch also gave an account of the perils of seeking venture capital financing:
And if an artisan should seek the assistance of a capitalist to enable him
to obtain the means of procuring a patent, he must disclose the invention to the man of whom he is in fact asking a favour, and thus put himself wholly in the power of the capitalist, who may dictate his owns
terms respecting the assistance which he will afford, and the manner of
doing it. In such cases poor inventors usually pay dearly for the assistance that they obtain; and it frequently happens that they fail to obtain
any profit from their inventions.
Id. at 13.
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phy. At first blush, this might seem counterintuitive in some respects. After all, as Merges has written, the twentieth century witnessed a gradual
“corporatization” of industrial research and development (“R&D”), and
American patent law responded to this trend with the professionalization
of the Patent Office,48 the liberalization of the rules for correcting inventorship, and the rejection of a doctrine that would have penalized patentees
for failure to “work” patented technology.49
In other respects, however, it makes sense that the heroic inventor motif has lingered in U.S. patent policy debates. First, it is conceivable that
the corporatization of R&D has reinforced the romantic appeal of the lone
inventor.50 Second, the heroic inventor motif, with its overtones of Jeffersonian self-reliance and Yankee ingenuity, may simply mesh uniquely
well with the American perception of its own identity.51 Third, the heroic
inventor rhetoric can be used to render technical, arid patent reform debates more accessible to nonspecialists. One might expect patent reformers
to be drawn to the strategy of reconceptualizing the reform debate by attempting to couple technical reform measures with the romantic imagery
of the lone inventor struggling against a recalcitrant bureaucracy.
The historical record of patent law reform yields a fair amount of anecdotal evidence to support this last claim of rhetorical power, a power
that endures over decades of American patent law reform. The U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (“PTO”) has done its share to contribute to this
venerable literary tradition. A worthy exemplar appears on the PTO’s Independent Inventor Resources website:

48. Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law
1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2216 (2000) (observing that corporate R&D departments tended to file more patent applications, precipitating a need for administrative
reform to enable the Patent Office to handle the heavy application volumes).
49. This occurred at the time that corporate entities were beginning to acquire patent
protection for defensive purposes, and otherwise developing strategic patent portfolios. A
requirement that patented technology be “worked” would have complicated, and might
have thwarted, these efforts. Id. at 2219-21.
50. Perhaps the same phenomenon occurred in Dickens’ time. Nineteenth century
observers experiencing the Industrial Revolution might surely have perceived that the day
of the lone inventor—as embodied in the local craftsmen of the pastoral economy—was
passing.
51. There is also some evidence that the independent inventor theme has played well
outside the United States at various times. See, e.g., PETER MEINHARDT, INVENTIONS
PATENTS AND MONOPOLY 237-244 (1946) (suggesting reform legislation for the British
patent system that would provide various forms of assistance to “small” inventors); see
also text accompanying notes 89-92 infra (discussing second tier patent regimes).
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To paraphrase our Declaration of Independence, America is the
land of the free, home of the brave, and haven for the independent inventor. Nowhere else in the world does a government exist
that supports its independent inventors to the extent that we do.
The independent inventor is America’s natural resource.52

Another example comes from mid-1960’s symposium commentary
from PTO officials in honor of the 175th anniversary of the U.S. Patent
System. A symposium article published in the Journal of the Patent Office
Society offered a poetic ode to the “Godly Inventor,” commencing, “A
spark ignites your restless mind, a fearless soul, it starts to grind . . . .”53
While scholars may be hard pressed to take seriously these grinding
minds54 and revisions to basic American scripture,55 it seems significant
that the PTO persists in its desire to offer homage to the heroic inventor.
Whether purely the product of pragmatic considerations,56 or for purposes
of political expediency, the heroic inventor and attendant symbolism lives
on in American patent administration.
The heroic inventor motif also manifests itself in judicial opinions.
Patent litigators, present and past, undoubtedly would consider it glaringly
obvious that the heroic inventor motif matters in patent litigation, the heroinventor being the quintessential protagonist in the patent infringement
narrative. Writing in the mid-1950’s, Judge Rifkind captured this notion
with Dickensian felicity:
[I]n the eyes of the proponent of the patent, his client generally is
the poor, famished, garret inventor pursuing for years his private
faith in his particular vision of the new and useful; at the end of
the first act he is the proud possessor of a diploma of achieve52. Independent Inventor Resources, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/iip/welcome.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2001) (displaying statement of Richard J. Apley,
Director, USPTO Office of Independent Inventor Programs).
For earlier incarnations of PTO programs on behalf of independent inventors,
see Isaac Fleischmann, The Patent Office and the Independent Inventor, 47 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 459 (1965), detailing mid-1960’s Patent Office efforts to assist independent inventors, and Maurice A. Crews, Problems of the Independent Inventor, 41 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 159, 163 (1959), containing the Assistant Commissioner of Patents’ introduction
of a pamphlet designed for independent inventors, and discussion of some “self-evident”
problems faced by independent inventors who seek to use the patent system.
53. Fleischmann, supra note 52, at 465.
54. Or grinding souls, as it may be.
55. See generally PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1997) (saying nothing whatsoever about the “land of the free,
home of the brave”).
56. For example, to reduce the costs associated with assisting pro se applicants.
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ment from the Patent Office; at the end of the second act, you
find him complaining bitterly that a greedy corporation has kidnapped his brain child and its inheritance.57

This is not to suggest, however, that the heroic inventor motif in patent
litigation is confined to relatively superficial appeals to emotion. For example, Federal Circuit judges still periodically invoke the interests and
imagery of the independent inventor in crafting and applying patent law
rules.58 In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,59 Judge
Linn argued that the Federal Circuit majority’s rule on prosecution history
estoppel “wrongfully sets in place a regime that increases the cost and
complexity of patent prosecution to the detriment of individual inventors. .
.”60 and “discounts the intrinsic worth in treating more fairly the individual
inventor whose patent right is under administrative scrutiny.”61 On occa57. Simon H. Rifkind, The Romance Discoverable in Patent Cases, 37 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 319, 322 (1955). Judge Rifkind also recorded his doubts that the romance of the
hero-inventor motif had seeped into the general judicial consciousness:
[T]he same judges write both patent opinions and admiralty opinions.
But the lay reader would never guess that fact. No sooner does a judge
betake himself to an admiralty case, but he immediately fancies himself
a latter day Conrad. His manuscript is redolent of resin and sea water,
his paragraphs are resonant with whistles and general alarms. He tells a
story of a burning cargo in a far off sea, of lifeboats launched in storms,
of brave rescues, and sudden deaths. It is plain he enjoys the telling of
the story.
But not so when he ponders his patent cases. Then he writes only of
claims and specifications, of prior art and anticipations. Of the inventor—nary a word.
Id. at 329-30.
58. The heroic inventor may be functioning in this context as a decision-making
heuristic. See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming
2002) (on file with author) (providing examples from securities litigation).
59. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 2519 (U.S. Jun. 18,
2001) (No. 00-1543 ).
60. Id. at 620 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Linn worried that:
[T]he majority’s new rule will substantially increase the cost of obtaining patent protection, and may in fact become prohibitively high for individual inventors and start-up companies . . . . These increases in costs
and complexity will also come at a time when greater prosecution investments may be hard for many applicants to justify because the
commercial value of the inventions covered may not then be fully apparent. In my view, this will most detrimentally impact individual inventors and start-up companies. . . .
Id. at 624.
61. Id. at 628.
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sion, judges also debate whether various substantive patent law rules
should be subject to exceptions or limitations for independent inventors:
for example, the on-sale62 and public use bars,63 and damages under the
reasonable royalty methodology64 and other, more creative, damages theories.65
62. E.g., Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(upholding the application of the on-sale bar to a transaction between arguably related
entities, but seeming to suggest that the bar might not apply to cases in which “an individual inventor takes a design to a fabricator and pays the fabricator for its services in
fabricating a few sample products”).
63. E.g., Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reviewing
whether an independent inventor’s pre-critical date uses of an invention were barring
public uses or experimental uses). Judge Lourie, for the panel majority, acknowledged
that relatively informal and “seemingly casual” activities undertaken by independent inventors might qualify as experimental use for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), but insisted
that evidence of “the same basic elements that are required to validate any experimental
program” must still be present. Id. at 1121. Judge Lourie goes on to state that:
The law does not waive statutory requirements for inventors of lesser
sophistication. When one distributes his invention to members of the
public under circumstances that evidence a near total disregard for supervision and control concerning its use, the absence of these minimal
indicia of experimentation require a conclusion that the invention was
in public use.
Id. at 1122.
Judge Plager dissented. He rendered a classic portrait of the lone inventor:
This is not a contest between . . . the two big competitors in this field . .
. . If it were, we could expect the combination of engineering and legal
staffs on each side to be punctilious about observing the niceties of our
prior opinions on how to conduct experiments so as to avoid any possible running afoul of the public use bar. No, this is a home-made improvement by a man with only a high school education who worked on
boats and boat engines, including his own, where he kept encountering
the problem . . . that [others] had failed to solve. He solved it by trial
and error, with an ingenious bushing of his own design, and, on his
grandfather's metal lathe, after several tries, fashioned a half-dozen prototype seals that looked like they might do the job.
Id. at 1123.
According to Judge Plager, the majority clearly should have taken account of the
plaintiff’s status as an independent inventor, excusing his failure to keep detailed records
and to obtain appropriate confidentiality agreements, rather than demanding a level of
legal sophistication that “we lawyers, with our clean and dry hands, have come to prefer.”
Id. at 1124.
64. See Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (observing
that the use of a pure willing licensor/willing licensee model, without regard to other
Georgia Pacific factors, ‘risks creation of the perception that blatant, blind appropriation
of inventions patented by individual, nonmanufacturing inventors is the profitable, can’tlose course”) (quoting Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568,
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I do not mean to draw grandiose inferences here. Judges may have no
conscious motivation for reverting to the heroic inventor narrative; they
may simply perceive that they are reporting the facts of the cases before
them. Whether out of necessity or desire, by continuing to link plaintiffpatentees with the independent inventor motif, judges ensure the motif’s
lingering relevance to patent policy debates.
The normative implications of this linkage are unclear. Economists
and others have disagreed throughout the twentieth century about whether
independent inventors or corporate R&D groups contribute more profoundly to technological innovation.66 Historians have worried that the
impulse to lionize individuals as inventor-heroes has the potential to cause
mischief in the historical record.67 Legal commentators have expressed
1575 (Fed. Cir.1988)). But cf. Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1580-81 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (cautioning against the use of a punitive “Panduit kicker” in calculating a reasonable royalty).
65. An examination of the inventor-as-hero phenomenon would hardly be complete
without at least passing reference to the war of the windshield wipers, pitting Robert
Kearns against the automobile industry. In Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541 (Fed.
Cir. 1994), one of Kearns’ many cases, Kearns had prevailed on a claim against Chrysler
for damages for Chrysler’s past infringement, but additionally sought to have Chrysler
enjoined from producing the infringing products for a predetermined future period, even
though the infringed patents had expired. The post-expiration injunctive relief, Kearns
reasoned, compensated him for the loss of true “exclusivity” under his patents. Id. at
1549. The Federal Circuit expressed sympathy with Kearns’ complaint “that his patents
have expired without his ever being able to exclude others from practice of his invention,
especially since he is an individual inventor contending with a multitude of giant corporations,” but refused the requested relief. Id. at 1550-51; see also id. at 1551 n.11 (adding
that “[t]he fact that Kearns has fired several of his attorneys and attempted to conduct
massive multiple suits pro se may be relevant to his dilemma”).
66. An oft-cited source in the early 1960s literature on the role of independent inventors at that time is JOHN JEWKES ET AL., THE SOURCES OF INVENTION 223-25 (1958)
(concluding that even as of the mid-twentieth century, inventors working independently
of large organizations were still contributing significantly to technological progress); see
also WILLIAM B. BENNETT, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM: AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION 197-98 (1943) (asserting that “it might be argued that the independent inventor
assumes an ever greater importance as a larger portion of American patents spring from
corporate research” because corporate research shuns risky, pioneering endeavors);
GEORGE E. FOLK, PATENTS AND INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS: A SUMMARY, ANALYSIS, AND
EVALUATION OF THE RECORD ON PATENTS OF THE TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE 144-66 (1942) (summarizing testimony on the role of independent inventors
in the 1940s U.S. economy and concluding that encouraging independent inventors
should continue as a focus of the U.S. patent system).
67. Louis C. Hunter, The Heroic Theory of Invention, in TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN AMERICA 25-46 (Edwin T. Layton ed., 1973) (noting the tendency of historians to attribute important technological innovations to individual heroic figures, when in
fact such innovations routinely have come about through the collective efforts of multiple
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suspicion that the independent inventor motif may skew legislative policy
debates.68 Perhaps Federal Circuit judges should resolve to become more
cautious about deploying heroic inventor rhetoric in opinions, or at least
take a hard look at the argument that special rules or exceptions should
apply to independent inventors, to better ensure that such claims rest on a
legitimate policy basis rather than a literary tradition.69
In the context of patent reform through patent litigation, it may be difficult to evaluate how much influence to attribute to the heroic inventor
motif. In the context of patent reform through the legislative process,
however, the influence and pervasiveness of the motif are more easily
contributors). Hunter uses the invention of the steamboat as an illustration of the phenomenon.
68. See, e.g., John C. Stedman, The U.S. Patent System and Its Current Problems,
42 TEX. L. REV. 450, 496 (1954) (arguing that while “[t]here are frequent assertions that
small business needs the patent system and gets more protection from it than big business, and defenders of the patent system rarely have difficulty rounding up “small business” witnesses to testify whenever the patent system is under attack,” it remains unclear
to what extent these assertions “are anecdotal rather than general, or based upon emotion
rather than fact”).
69. While they are at it, it might also be advisable for judges to consider the potential emergence of a competing motif—the heroic infringer. Arguably, the Cellpro patent
litigation qualifies as a narrative of this type. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, 978 F.
Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1997). Judge McKelvie, opining on damages, wrote:
One element of the strategy CellPro has adopted in this battle has been
to hold itself out as a warrior in a twentieth-century holy crusade. It
claims it is out to advance science, to save lives, to fight cancer, and
improve the human condition. If it infringed Dr. Civin’s patents, so it
says, it was only to do good. That is the image CellPro seeks to project
of itself in this litigation and elsewhere.
Id. at 196.
He proceeded to comment that while there is “some truth” to the image that
CellPro sought to project, “[i]n other ways, however, this image is a facade constructed
by the venture capitalists” who started CellPro. Id. Judge McKelvie was not amused, and
imposed enhanced damages. CellPro offered its take on the litigation in a popular book,
RICK MURDOCK & DAVID FISHER, PATIENT NUMBER ONE: A TRUE STORY OF HOW ONE
CEO TOOK ON CANCER AND BIG BUSINESS IN THE FIGHT OF HIS LIFE (2000).
Law review commentary on the case focuses on the issue of march-in rights.
Because a federally funded research project had generated the inventions claimed in the
Johns Hopkins patents, those patents were potentially subject to compulsory licensing
under the “march-in” rights provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 203(1). Cellpro petitioned the federal funding agency (the NIH) to exercise march-in rights, but the NIH declined after
extensive administrative review. See generally Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded Inventions: The Bayh-Dole Act and the Hopkins v. Cellpro March-in Rights Controversy, 8
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211 (2000); Barbara M. McGarey & Annette C. Levey, Patents,
Products, and Public Health: An Analysis of the CellPro March-In Petition, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095 (1999).
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demonstrated. Commentaries and legislative studies on U.S. patent law
reform in the mid-twentieth century periodically acknowledged the interests of independent inventors, generally focusing on the cost and complexity of patent prosecution and litigation.70 A mid-1950’s legislative report71
acknowledged the obstacles faced by independent inventors,72 and concluded that:
the individual inventor . . . performs a vital and important function. The patent system is designed to encourage this type of inventor, and the patent statutes, Patent Office administration, and
the patent system as a whole must be considered, and improved
where necessary, in the light of this purpose.73

70. See, e.g., FLOYD VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM 265, 261-84
(1956) (identifying the expense of interference proceedings and litigation among the defects of the patent system that might frustrate the efforts of independent inventors); A.J.
Hayes, The Independent Inventor’s Interest, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 298, 303 (1965)
(questioning rules for ownership of employee inventions and asserting that patent administration must be kept “as inexpensive and simple as possible”); David Rines, Do We
Need a Patent System?, 51 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 501 (1969) (answering yes, and lamenting
that the expense of patent litigation might discourage independent inventors from disclosing their inventions via the patent system).
A relevant legislative study is STAFF OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., INDEPENDENT INVENTORS AND THE PATENT SYSTEM (Comm. Print 1961) (C.D. Tuska, author)
(attempting to gauge the patent activities of various independent inventors through a
largely inscrutable analysis of selected tax cases involving licensing royalties and the
like).
For commentary of more recent vintage, but in this same tradition, see Donald
Grant Kelly, America’s Inventors Have Arrived (And We Thought They Were “Invisible.”), 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 601 (1998), describing progress on “inventor-friendly” patent legislation proposals.
71. REVIEW OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM, S. REP. NO. 84-1464 (1956).
72. The report related that:
The subcommittee heard an almost unanimous chorus of dissatisfaction from individual inventors. The normal market, investment, and business hazards attending any innovation—
whether a new product, a new machine, or a substantive improvement—are already so large that the additional and . . . as
they see it, unnecessary administrative and judicial hazards
now incurred in securing and protecting a patent represent the
straw that breaks the camel’s back.
Id. at 2.
73. Id.
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Similarly, in Small Business and the Proposed Patent Reform Act of
1967,74 one commentator identified several proposed reforms that would
disadvantage independent inventors, including first-to-file provisions,75
early publication coupled with pre-grant opposition and post-grant revocation,76 and the proposed elimination of the 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) grace period.77 A reform that would have afforded applicants the option to file
“preliminary” applications (comparable to provisional applications under
current U.S. law) likewise came under fire.78
In some instances, pressure on behalf of independent inventors has led
directly to proposals, and sometimes legislation, expressly alleviating burdens of independent inventors. Perhaps the most obvious example is legislation providing that qualified “small entities” can receive reductions in
government fees associated with patent prosecution.79 Other recent initiatives have included proposals for subsidizing foreign patent filings80 and
fee-shifting for patent litigation against the federal government.81
74. William E. Schuyler, Jr., Small Business and the Proposed Patent Reform Act of
1967, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 122 (1967).
75. Schuyler argued that first-to-file provisions would force inventors to file earlier
and more often, purely for defensive purposes. Id. at 125-26. Presumably this would generate increased patent prosecution costs, the burden of which would fall hardest on small
business.
76. Pre-grant oppositions would contribute to delay in patent issuance. Id. at 127. In
general, according to Schuyler, opposition and revocation proceedings favored the wellheeled—those having the resources to monitor published patent applications routinely so
as to identify targets for oppositions, to initiate opposition proceedings, and to respond
when subjected to such proceedings on one’s own applications. Small business lacked the
resources to monitor and to initiate proceedings, but was likely to be subjected to such
proceedings. Id. at 132-33.
77. Id. at 131-32 (arguing that the lack of a grace period would be particularly problematic for small business because they are least likely to consult a patent lawyer until
after some development effort—and valuable time—has been invested).
78. Id. at 129-30 (offering the familiar argument that the provisional application
might not contain an adequate description to support claims in a subsequent regular application, exposing the applicant to possible invalidating intervening prior art). Of course,
this would be equally true for large and small-entity applicants, assuming no disparity in
the quality of counsel preparing the provisional application.
79. See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1994) (providing for a reduction in fees for independent
inventors and other qualifying entities); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.9, 1.27, 1.28 (1999) (procedures
for establishing entitlement to reduced fees and correcting pertinent errors). The relevant
regulations recently have been amended to simplify claims to small entity status. See 65
Fed. Reg. 54659 (2000); see also DH Tech., Inc. v. Synergystex Int’l, 154 F.3d 1333
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (vacating and remanding district court ruling that a patent was unenforceable where the patentee had erroneously paid small entity fees).
80. The “SBIR and STTR Foreign Patent Protection Act of 2001.” See Legislation/Patents: Bill Would Fund Patent Costs of Small Businesses, 62 PAT. TRADEMARK &
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In other instances, it appears that lobbying efforts on behalf of independent inventors has materially affected more general patent legislation.
For example, provisions on the publication of pending patent applications
18 months after filing, enacted as part of the 1999 reform package,82 allow
applicants to opt out of the publication regime if they certify that they
have not and will not file foreign applications in jurisdictions requiring
publication 18 months after filing.83 These provisions bear the unmistakable influence of lobbying on behalf of independent inventors.
That lobbying effort included liberal reference to the heroic inventor.
For example, William P. Parker, President of the Vermont Inventors Association, testified on disadvantages of the early publication provisions:
[O]thers are able to view and assess an innovation before the actual inventor can either commercialize it or even know if it will
be granted a patent. For a large corporation with a legal staff and
financial resources, such early review poses no threat. But for the
individual inventor, early publication can lead to ruin. Often he
will have spent five years of his life between conceiving the idea
and acquiring a patent. He uses the money that might have been
spent on a car, a house, or his child’s education to bring his idea
to fruition. Unlike the corporation, he has no budget for legal

COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 369 (Aug. 17, 2001) (reporting on S. 1323, introduced August 2,
2001). SBIR refers to the Small Business Innovation Research program; STTR refers to
the Small Business Technology Transfer program. The bill would offer grants for foreign
patent filings, in exchange for a portion of royalties. See also J. Douglas Hawkins, Importance and Access of International Patent Protection for the Independent Inventor, 3 U.
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145, 146 (1995) (asserting that the independent inventor “is
still responsible for a disproportionate amount of input in the invention process” and arguing that fees for PCT filings must be controlled to facilitate the acquisition of foreign
patent protection by independent inventors).
81. JUST COMPENSATION OF PATENT OWNERS FOR UNLICENSED USE BY UNITED
STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 104-373 (1995) (accompanying H.R. 632, whose purpose was “to
help small business, independent inventors and nonprofit organizations recover the legal
costs associated with defending their patents when the Federal government is found liable
for taking them,” e.g., under application of 28 U.S.C. §1498(a)).
See also Patent Law Revision Part 2: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 616 (1968)
(statement of Henry J. Cappello, NSBA consultant) (proposing establishment of a special
patent litigation fund to defray attorney’s fees for independent inventors initiating patent
infringement actions).
82. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (Supp. 2001) (addressing publication); id. § 154(d)
(addressing provisional rights to compensation for unauthorized exploitation of inventions claimed in published patent applications).
83. Id. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i).




3$7(17$%2/,7,21,60





counsel should his idea be stolen. The rules for publication must
reflect this discrepancy.84

Early publication, according to Parker, might unwittingly confer a substantial benefit on “idea thieves.” Upon early publication of a patent application claiming a commercially valuable invention:
[t]he idea-thieves can make money from the idea before the patent even issues and when they are challenged, are in a better position financially to defend themselves than the legitimate owner.
Worse, if this party is in a foreign country or is a large corporation, then the inventor’s recourse is virtually hopeless.85

Testimony from the 1990 legislative debate addressing the impact of
proposed patent law reforms on independent inventors and small business
was among the most caustic in recent memory.86 Congress’ response ex-

84. The Omnibus Patent Act of 1997: Hearings on S. 507 and H.R. 400 (S. Hrg.
105-95) Before Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 49 (1997).
85. Id. Parker proceeded to recommend that the individual inventor have the option
to withhold publication if the application was not being submitted overseas, and urged
that “[e]arly publication would be more acceptable to individual inventors if it occurred 3
months after the second office action.” Id. Parker also argued that a provisional rights
provision giving inventors a right to collect a royalty for unauthorized use of a published
application would not adequately compensate the individual inventor (because he envisions a scenario where multiple unlicensed competitors flood the market and undermine
the true inventor’s marketing strategy). Provisional rights provisions giving the inventor
the right to collect` “substantial” damages would be more acceptable.
86. See, e.g., Impact on U.S. Exporters of the New GATT Patent Accord: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm.
on International Relations, 104th Cong. (1995), which included discussion of an agreement between Ron Brown, then the Secretary of Commerce, and Japanese officials under
which the Clinton administration agreed to press for certain U.S. patent reforms (including early publication of patent applications and reexamination reform) while the Japanese
would institute certain reforms to the Japanese patent system. David L. Hill, President of
the “Patent Enforcement Fund, Inc.,” likened early publication and reexamination reform
as memorialized in the bilateral agreement to “an attack on the U.S. economy which in
the long-term would be comparable to the military attack from Japan at Pearl Harbor.” Id.
at 2; see also id. at 68-77 (appending to Hill’s prepared statement an article, entitled The
Putsch to Enfeeble the Independent U.S. Inventor, characterizing proposals for early publication, reexamination reform, and first-to-file as being “targeted to weaken the position
of the independent inventor” and thereby undermine the U.S. economy); id. at 98-109
(written statement of Ronald J. Riley, Advisory Board President, Alliance for American
Innovation, similar in tone and content); Changes in U.S. Patent Law and Their Implications for Energy and Environment Research and Development: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Energy and Environment of the House Comm. on Science, 104th Cong. 197
(1996) (quoting the statement of Salvatore J. Monte, executive of a specialty chemical
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tended beyond compromising the publication regime. In a rather transparent gesture that sought, perhaps, to mollify independent inventors, Congress labeled the reform package the American Inventors Protection Act of
1999, even though it contained numerous reforms that independent inventors opposed.87 Moreover, the Act commenced with a title on “Inventor’s
Rights,” concerning restrictions on Invention Promotion businesses, which
had attained a notorious reputation for preying on independent inventors.88
Sympathy for the plight of the independent inventor also motivates
proposals for second tier patent systems in various parts of the world.89
Second tier systems generally promise less cumbersome pre-grant procedures, which entail correlative savings in time and cost, little or no substantive pre-grant examination, and softened patentability requirements
(particularly a diminished threshold for obviousness).90
In the new Australian “Innovation Patent” regime (“IP Australia”), one
example of a second tier regime, applicants can file applications and pay
relevant fees online. IP Australia represents that most innovation patents
will be granted within one month of application filing.91 All of this, according to IP Australia, is “designed to suit the needs of Australian small

company: “Laying open patents after 18 months opens the small inventor to patent flooding tactics and challenges from deep-pocketed Japanese industrial cartels”).
87. Some found irony here. E.g., Phyllis Schlafly, Don’t Fall for Phony Patent Reform, at http://www.inventionconvention.com/inventorsvoice/urgentalerts/080199schlafly.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2001). Schafly notes:
This bill is called the American Inventors Protection Act, but should be
called the Inventors Elimination Act. The independent inventors would
be squeezed out and their inventions stolen from them, all for the benefit of the foreigners and the giant corporations.
Id.
88. The relevant provision is now codified at 35 U.S.C. § 297 (1994) (imposing
disclosure requirements on “invention promoters,” recognizing a civil cause of action for
customers who are defrauded by such promoters, and providing optional statutory damages in such civil actions).
89. See generally Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 151 (1999) (criticizing second tier patent proposals). But cf. Uma Suthersanen, Incremental Inventions in Europe: A Legal and Economic Appraisal of Second Tier Patents, 2001 J. BUS. L. 319 (offering a cautiously optimistic assessment).
90. An example is the Australian “Innovation Patent.” See Anne Duffy, Australia:
Patents—Patents Amendment (Innovation Patents) Act 2000, 23(4) EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. N37-39 (2001) (describing the legislation as enacted); Janis, supra note 89, at 16773 (describing relevant proposals).
91. The Innovation Patents Kit, at http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/patents/P_innvopat_about.htm at 3 (last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
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to medium sized enterprises (“SMEs”) and individuals and help reduce the
risks involved in research and development.”92
In debating second tier patent regimes, modern patent policymakers
are, no doubt unwittingly, invoking Dickens. At the conclusion of A Poor
Man’s Tale, Dickens’ protagonist, Old John, is bidding goodbye to his
carpenter friend, Thomas Joy, when Thomas Joy delivers a full-fledged
legislative proposal for a second tier patent system:
Thomas said to me, when we parted, ‘John, if the laws of this
country were as honest as they ought to be, you would have
come to London—registered an exact description and drawing of
your invention—paid half-a-crown or so for doing of it—and
therein and thereby have got your Patent.’ My opinion is the
same as Thomas Joy.93

One cannot help but expect that patent law reform debates will continue to revert periodically to narratives about the heroic inventor.
III.

THE ABOLITIONIST MOVEMENT: ESSENTIAL THEMES
AND THEIR MODERN COUNTERPARTS

Following the passage of the 1852 Act,94 patent reform efforts gradually transformed into a full-fledged movement emphasizing patent law
abolition over patent law reform. The patent abolitionist debate caught the
attention of a wide range of interests, among them patent professionals,
academics, inventors, and business owners.95 One can capture the flavor of
the debate, if not its full political complexity, by viewing it as a dialogue
between leading figures: Robert Macfie, an ardent abolitionist, and Hindmarch and Webster, a pair of patent lawyers who supported reform, but
opposed abolition.96
92. Id. at 4. In previous work, I have expressed doubts about these claims. See Janis,
supra note 89, at 178-88 (questioning whether second tier systems will enhance independent inventor potential to obtain meaningful, enforceable patent rights).
93. PHILLIPS, supra note 22, at 21.
94. The approach of the Great Exhibition of 1851 gave added urgency to the patent
law reform agenda of 1850-51. E.g., COULTER, supra note 14, at 39. For general background on the Great Exhibition, see, e.g., JEFFREY A. AUERBACH, THE GREAT EXHIBITION OF 1851 (1999). For an interesting brief account focusing on international trade implications, see John Kemper, Internationalism and the Search for a National Identity:
Britain and the Great Exhibition of 1851 (2000), at http://www.stanford.edu/group/w1/Spring2000/exhibition/paper.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2002).
95. E.g., COULTER, supra note 14, at 91-92.
96. While it might be supposed that the debate would have pitted abolitionists
against defenders of the status quo (rather than abolitionists versus reformers), in fact
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Robert Andrew Macfie, a sugar refiner who also served in the House
of Commons during part of the time period when abolition was being debated,97 was single-handedly responsible for a good share of the proabolition literature,98 and a good share of invective about the patent system.99 Hindmarch, a leading patent law commentator100 and barrister, pub-

there were few defenders of the status quo. See, e.g., Victor M. Batzel, Legal Monopoly
in Liberal England: The Patent Controversy in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 22 BUS.
HIST. 189, 190 (1980).
97. Id. at 59-60 (describing Macfie’s sugar manufacturing interests); id. at 136 (telling of Macfie’s election to the House of Commons in 1868); id. at 160 (relating Macfie’s
unsuccessful bid for re-election in 1874, when Disraeli’s conservative government came
into power).
98. Included among Macfie’s compendious bibliography on the subject of patent
reform are numerous original writings and compilations of others’ works. See ROBERT
ANDREW MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS: PLEAS AND PLANS FOR
CHEAPER BOOKS AND GREATER INDUSTRIAL FREEDOM, WITH DUE REGARD TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE CLAIMS OF TALENT, THE DEMANDS OF TRADE, AND THE WANTS
OF THE PEOPLE (1879) (2 vols.) (collecting excerpts from many sources) [hereinafter
MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS]; ROBERT ANDREW MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS
ON THE ABOLITION OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE,
GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS (1869) (collecting letters, papers, and speeches by
Macfie and others) [hereinafter MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS]; ROBERT ANDREW
MACFIE, THE PATENT QUESTION UNDER FREE TRADE: A SOLUTION OF DIFFICULTIES BY
ABOLISHING OR SHORTENING THE INVENTORS’ MONOPOLY, AND INSTITUTING NATIONAL
RECOMPENSES (1864) [hereinafter MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION] (incorporating Macfie’s
1863 report to the Congress of the Association for the Promotion of Social Science, as
well as extracts from various works authored by others).
Of related interest is ROBERT ANDREW MACFIE, FREE-TRADE IN MANUFACTURES (2d ed. 1881) (compilation of materials from various sources). The full title gives
a glimpse of Macfie’s characteristic style and tone: CRIES IN A CRISIS, ANENT FREETRADE IN MANUFACTURES SHATTERED BY CONCESSIVE TREATIES AND AGGRESSIVE
BOUNTIES THAT FAVOUR FOREIGN AIMS UPON OUR INDUSTRIES AND SHIPPING: AND
ANENT THE EMPIRE AND EMIGRATION, PARLIAMENT AND ITS PROCEDURE.
99. According to Macfie:
I am sure that nobody can go over the evidence . . . without becoming convinced that the trade and manufactures of this country are seriously obstructed, fettered, retarded, harassed, and burdened, sometimes
demoralised, often wronged, or even robbed, by the multitude and
vexatious character of Patents . . .
MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS, supra note 98, at 61.
In similar tones, Macfie quotes a paper presented by J. Stirling, entitled “Patent
Right,” as proclaiming that “[t]he whole history of Patents is a long-continued story of
litigation and disappointment; and the more admirable the invention, the greater is the
certainty of difficulty and loss.” MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS, supra note 98, at 121.
The piece de resistance comes from Lord Granville, who is supposed to have
remarked in the Upper House in 1851 that:
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lished a slim volume in 1851 specifically devoted to patent law reform. 101
Webster, another barrister, was also a prominent treatise writer102 and took
a substantial role in abolition debates.103
The patent abolitionism debate in Britain took place predominantly
from the 1860s to the early 1870s. The National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, formed in 1857, held annual congresses which
regularly featured addresses, papers, and debates on patent law reform and
abolition. Macfie and Webster figured prominently in such debates, which
extended over a period of some fifteen years.104 Abolitionists eventually
succeeded in taking their case to Parliament, which formed numerous
study committees during the period. From 1875 until the passage of the
1883 Act, Parliament debated a multiplicity of legislative reform packages.105 The movement gradually lost its abolitionist character and became, again, a reform movement,106 due in part to the onset of a severe
economic depression.107
The only persons who derive any advantage from the law of Patents are
the lawyers. Except, perhaps, warrants for horses, there is no subject
which gives such an opportunity for roguery as the Law of Patents.
MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS, supra note 98, at 212-213.
100. See HINDMARCH, supra note 16.
101. See HINDMARCH, supra note 25.
102. See WEBSTER, supra note 16; see also THOMAS WEBSTER, ON PROPERTY IN DESIGNS AND INVENTIONS IN THE ARTS AND MANUFACTURES (London, Chapman and Hall
1853); THOMAS WEBSTER, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS: STATUTES, PRACTICAL FORMS, AND DIGEST OF REPORTED CASES (1841), microformed on 19th-Century Legal Treatises, Fiche 55,281-55,282 (Research Publications
Int’l).
103. The intellectual property bar, a major force in modern U.S. patent policy debates, organized in Britain beginning in the early 1880s, too late to influence the abolitionist debate, although individual lawyers such as Webster certainly made themselves
heard. See COULTER, supra note 14, at 133.
104. Id. at 111-13.
105. Id.
106. COULTER, supra note 14, at 160-61 (asserting that while organizations continued
to apply pressure for patent abolition into the 1870s, abolitionist fervor in the Parliament
dissipated gradually by the mid-1870s).
107. DUTTON, supra note 1, at 29 (asserting that with the onset of the mid-1870s
Great Depression and the “emergence of protectionism,” the patent abolitionist movement suddenly collapsed; “intense international rivalry now made the patent system perfectly respectable once more”). Coulter sees the decline of the abolitionist movement as
more gradual. COULTER, supra note 14, at 160-61.
For discourse concerning the Great Depression of the mid-1870s (and the debate
among economists as to whether it really existed), see LEWIS C.B. SEAMAN, VICTORIAN
ENGLAND: ASPECTS OF ENGLISH AND IMPERIAL HISTORY 1837-1901, at 262-79 (1973),
commenting on the existence of a “Great Depression” in the British economy beginning
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Just as it drew in a wide range of interested parties, the patent abolition
debate also encompassed a wide range of substantive patent issues, three
of which are particularly relevant to modern patent reform. The first concerns alleged defects in the judicial administration of the patent system,
especially the role of juries and the use of generalist judges in patent
litigation.108 The second involves baseline philosophical justifications for
the granting of patent rights, juxtaposing natural rights against utilitarianism.109 Finally, the third involves the intersection between patents and international trade, extending both to “free trade” arguments and to primitive steps towards patent law harmonization.110
A.

Judicial Administration: The Jury and Specialized Courts

Many of the high-profile patent cases of the past decade have centered
around fundamental disputes over the judicial administration of the patent
system.111 Two classes of disputes have occupied center stage in the modin about 1873, and SIDNEY POLLARD, BRITAIN’S PRIME AND BRITAIN’S DECLINE: THE
BRITISH ECONOMY 1870-1914, at 241-43 (1989), discussing political dimensions of the
late 19th century British depression.
108. See infra Part III.A.
109. See infra Part III.B.
110. See infra Part III.C. Utilitarianism and free trade have been called “the two
dominant ideologies of the mid-Victorian era.” COULTER, supra note 14, at 73.
111. That the jury issue has preoccupied modern patent jurists hardly need be recounted. From Lockwood, to Markman, to Hilton Davis, and now—less directly—in
Festo, the Federal Circuit has been locked in a battle over the extent to which the jury
should participate in the patent system. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 976 (Fed. Cir.
1995), vacated by 116 S.Ct. 29 (1996); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d
967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Scholarly commentary has been abundant. A very small sample of relevant articles treating various aspects of the general problem includes, for example, Kenneth R.
Adamo, Reforming Jury Practice in Patent Cases: Suggestions Towards Learning to
Love Using an Eighteenth Century System While Approaching the Twenty-First Century,
78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 345 (1996); Mark D. Janis, Judge and Jury Roles
in Equivalents Analysis, Commentary on Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, 74
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 621 (1992); Allen N. Littman, The Jury’s Role in Determining Key Issues in Patent Cases, 37 IDEA 207 (1997); Michael A. Sartori, An Economic Incentives Analysis of the Jury’s Role in Patent Litigation,
79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 331 (1997); Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791 (2001).
The Federal Circuit has also taken the topic up at its judicial conferences. E.g.,
The Fourteenth Annual Judiciary Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, 170 F.R.D. 534, 598-620 (1996) (discussing the challenges raised by
the use of juries in patent trials); see also Paul R. Michel & Michelle Rhyu, Improving
Patent Jury Trials, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 89 (1996) (providing a judicial perspective).
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ern reform debate: (1) the role of the jury in patent litigation, particularly
as to enforcement issues; and (2) the efficacy of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit—more generally, the desirability of creating “expert”
tribunals for patent cases and their proper roles in the federal judiciary.
Documents from the British patent controversy illustrate that, by the middle of the nineteenth century, patent scholars were already debating these
same issues of judicial administration—identifying similar problems and
proposing similar solutions.
In 1851, Hindmarch reported that “[m]any persons obtain an opinion
that the courts of law of this country are not fitted to determine questions
respecting patent rights.”112 This objection to the efficacy of the “courts of
law” may be attributed to the competency either of judges to decide the
relevant questions of patent law, of juries to decide relevant questions of
technological fact, or both. Some reformers found fault with the judges,
and contended “that peculiar tribunals ought therefore to be erected with
exclusive jurisdiction over all suits respecting patents.”113 Webster also
noted the division over the question of specialized tribunals, and implied
that he favored them. Sounding remarkably like a modern-day commentator on the relationship between district courts and the Federal Circuit in
modern U.S. patent matters, Webster observed:
Concerning litigation on patents, opinion is divided between a
special tribunal or some modification of the existing system. It
may be observed, that the real trial of a patent case lies in the
court of appeal, and the chief question remaining is the mode of
trial at the preliminary stage, so as best to ascertain the facts for
the consideration of the court.114

Hindmarch disagreed, asserting that judges had performed capably in
resolving legal questions in patent cases,115 and blaming juries instead for
the inefficacy of the courts. According to Hindmarch, “there can be no

112. HINDMARCH, supra note 25, at 19.
113. Id.
114. TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE 886 (1863) (George W. Hastings, ed.) [hereinafter NAPSS TRANSACTIONS
1863] (reporting Webster’s oral comments).
115. HINDMARCH, supra note 25, at 19 (“The complaint . . . cannot apply to the mode
in which the law respecting patent privileges has in modern times been expounded by our
judges, for they have uniformly given the most favourable interpretation to the law of
which it was capable in favour of the rights of patentees; and although there have long
been many acknowledged defects in the law, the legislature alone could apply the necessary remedies.”).
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doubt that juries are rarely, if ever, found to be fully competent”116 to decide the fact questions in patent cases. Jury incompetence sprang both
from intrinsic factors and the jury’s probable lack of education: “In the
absence of a thorough understanding of the facts brought before them in
[patent] cases, juries are too prone to be swayed more by appeals to their
feelings and prejudices than by their reason. . . . ”117 However, Hindmarch
seemed unwilling to accept the proposition that juries would never be
competent to handle patent cases. He thought that the “unfitness” of juries
arose from “the limited nature of the education of the people, more particularly as to matters of science and art,”118 and contended that as education on such subjects became “more and more general,” juries would become better suited to decide cases involving technological facts.119
If some found fault with judges, others found fault with experts. The
following exchange between Macfie and Webster, before a House of
Commons committee in 1871, illustrates Webster’s skepticism about the
usefulness of expert witnesses:
Macfie:

You have told the Committee in very apt language,
that at present a trial [in a patent case] is a speculation on the ignorance of the judge and jury; have you
any cases that would illustrate that?

Webster:

I think almost every case, where there is any
complication at all in an invention, which requires
experts to explain it to the judge and jury, is a
speculation, because you have the plaintiff starting
with a number of scientific witnesses, and there is a
kind of practical difficulty in the defendant’s way, if
he does not call the same number of scientific
witnesses . . . The present system has this great vice
in it, that it allows witnesses to give evidence with
regard to matters of opinion rather than matters of
fact; and that would be checked at once by a judge
with skilled assessors . . .120

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 2 MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS, supra note 98, at 374 (reprinting extracts
from the 1871 Report of the Committee of the House of Commons on Letters Patents).
See also the comments of Sir Roundell Palmer, who advocated outright abolition of the
British patent system:
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Arguments about the cost of patent trials paralleled arguments about
competency. As Hindmarch reported, other commentators cited the “great
expense” of patent trials as another reason for creating patent tribunals
separate from the general courts of law.121 Hindmarch recognized a fundamental problem with both the competency and cost arguments: even if
they were valid, they could not be confined to patent cases alone.122 Even
in the nineteenth century, other types of civil cases involved complex factual questions.
These issues appeared prominently in the U.S. patent reform agenda
for a century and a half following the British patent controversy. The project to create a patent-focused court of appeals in the United States endured for nearly a century, and stands as perhaps the most commonly repeated reform suggested in the entirety of the twentieth century patent reform literature.123 The debate continues today over the success of the FedIn dealing with Patent cases in a court of law there was generally a vast
array of witnesses to be examined, consisting of mechanics, chemists,
and scientific men of all sorts on one side and the other. Then there
were the jury, who knew nothing of the subject, and the judge, who
might be placed in a worse position, because he might imagine he
understood all about it when he did not. . . .[I]t might very easily
happen that an ingenious professional witness might so argue the case
under the form of giving evidence as to lead the judge to think that he
really knew all about it when such was not in reality the fact.
MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS, supra note 98, at 107.
121. HINDMARCH, supra note 25, at 20. Hindmarch expressed skepticism that the
creation of an alternative, expert tribunal for patent cases would reduce the costs of patent
litigation. See id. at 21 (“[T]hose who advocate the institution of a special tribunal . . .
seem to forget that the expense of it would be great; probably much more in proportion to
the business to be done, than the total amount of costs in patents actions tried in our
courts of law . . . .”).
122. Id. at 20. (stating that “the great expense of law proceedings is not confined to
patent suits: and patentees have no greater claim for relief in this respect than many other
classes of persons”).
123. The literature on this issue is immense. For an exhaustive survey of legislative
efforts to create a patent court of appeals from 1887 through 1921, see STAFF OF THE
SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., SINGLE COURT OF PATENT APPEALS—A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2-9 (1959) (Margaret M. Conway, author).
For scholarly commentary from the first half of the twentieth century, see, for
example, Otto Raymond Barnett, The Proposed Court of Patent Appeals, 6 MICH. L.
REV. 441 (1908); William H. Davis, Proposed Modifications in the Patent System, 12
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 796 (1947); Evan A. Evans, Shall the United States Have a
Special Patent Court of Appeals?, 36 U. ILL. L. REV. 643 (1942); Charles F. Meroni,
Comments and Observations Concerning Recommendations in Report of the National
Patent Planning Commission, 26 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 117 (1944); Edwin J. Prindle, Pro-
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eral Circuit experiment, the role of the Supreme Court in the modern U.S.
patent system, and the desirability of expert patent trial courts.124
Similarly, it is not difficult to find expressions of judicial discontent
over the use of juries in U.S. patent cases over the entire course of the
twentieth century. Consider the unmasked skepticism and air of resignation evident in the jury charge in this 1901 patent infringement case:
It is a very mistaken system of jurisprudence that leaves the decision of the issues of fact that arise in a patent case to a jury. In
the very nature of things, it is extremely awkward and difficult,
and many times practically impossible, for 12 laymen, untrained
in the examination of the intricate questions which so frequently
arise in patent causes, without any facilities for taking notes, and
with no opportunity for the lengthened reflection which is frequently necessary to reach a wise conclusion in cases of this
kind,—I say it is many times practically impossible for them to
dispose of such questions.125

posal of a Single Court of Patent Appeals and Draft of a Bill Therefor, 13 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 438 (1931); Charles L. Reynolds, In Favor of a Single Court of Patent Appeals, 13
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 596 (1931); Elliott J. Stoddard, Comments on Mr. Lane’s Letter as to
the Bill for a Court of Patent Appeals, 14 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 188 (1932); Fritz Von
Briesen, The Confusion of Patent Courts in the United States, 5 THE BRIEF 358 (1905)
(discussing the idea of a single court of patent appeals); Edmund Wetmore, Patent Law,
17 YALE L.J. 101 (1907); Report of Patent Committee to National Research Council, 1 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 341 (1919); and William R. Woodward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative Law, 55 HARV. L. REV. 950 (1942). Cf. Wallace R. Lane, Why a Single Court of Patent Appeals is Not Necessary, 13 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 569 (1931); Frank E. Liverance, An Alternative for a Single Court of Patent Appeals, 14 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 816 (1932); Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37 ABA 425 (1951).
For more recent commentary, see sources cited in Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in
the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 392 nn.22-28 (2001).
124. An example can be found in John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial
Court With a Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
765, 782-83 (2000) (proposing that the U.S. Court of International Trade be given subject
matter jurisdiction over patent cases in parallel with existing jurisdiction in the district
courts).
The U.K. has an ongoing experiment with expert patent tribunals of first instance, the Patents County Court. See John N. Adams, Choice of Forum in Patent Disputes, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 497 (1995) (discussing history of Patents County
Court); Richard Price, Patent Litigation In England—Quiet Revolution, 17 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 290 (1995) (noting early success and popularity of the Patents County Court).
125. Int’l Tooth Crown Co. v. Hanks Dental Ass’n, 111 F. 916, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1901),
rev’d on other grounds, 130 F. 1022 (2d Cir. 1904) (Circuit Judge Lacombe, charging
jury).
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Ruling on a petition for mandamus, directing a district judge to reinstate jury demands in a patent infringement lawsuit, Judge Sobeloff of the
Fourth Circuit expressed similar sentiments several decades later:
We are neither oblivious of nor insensitive to the contentions that
the jury trial is a cumbersome and unwieldy mechanism for dealing with the complex factual settings and intricate legal framework of patent cases. We cannot dispute the assertion that the
trial of all patent cases to juries would add significantly to the
congestion of district court dockets.126

Judges have written frankly about the need to rein in juries in patent
cases through post-trial motion practice:
The complex issues of validity, infringement, and accounting in
patent cases do not often lend themselves today to proper determination by a lay jury, and it may frequently be necessary, in
jury trials of patent cases, for the Court to set aside the jury verdict and render judgment non obstante veredicto in the interest of
justice . . . . A lay jury . . . could become hopelessly lost in an attempt to resolve the more complex issues of a patent case involving complicated mechanical inventions.127

In a scattering of other cases, courts express these same general frustrations and seek a variety of solutions.128
126. Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 344 (4th Cir. 1971) (granting litigants’
request for jury, albeit grudgingly).
127. Railex Corp. v. Joseph Guss & Sons, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 119, 124-25 (D.D.C. 1966).
128. See generally Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Burris Indus. 619 F.2d 660, 667 (7th
Cir. 1980) (remarking that the case “is an excellent illustration of the wisdom of this
court's observation that ‘members of the Patent Bar have wisely avoided jury trials in
patent litigation’” and offering recommendations on the use of special verdicts on obviousness “because of the troublesome questions which seem to arise frequently where a
complex patent case is submitted to a jury of lay people”) (quoting Panther Pumps &
Eqpt. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225, 228 n.9 (7th Cir. 1972)); General Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 331 F.2d 192, 197-98 (4th Cir. 1964) (ruling no abuse of discretion to deny jury trial where party had waived rights, especially in view of “the
technicalities involved in determining the issues of patent validity and infringement, the
experience of the court in patent cases, the difficulties to be encountered in instructing a
jury, and the doubtful ability of jurors with only ordinary experience to comprehend the
complex issues and to reach a correct conclusion”); Great Plains Chem. Co. v. Micro
Chem., Inc., 549 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Colo. 1982) (asserting that “[t]his case is a monument
to the risk of futility in asking a jury to decide a complex patent case” and referring to
proposals to create a special patents court). But cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research
Corp., 547 F. Supp. 401, 406 n.3 (D. Minn. 1982) (holding that jury’s special verdict answers should be reviewed under the typical j.n.o.v. standard, but questioning whether
detailed special verdict questions “would merely confuse the jury and further complicate
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It should be sobering to modern-day patent law reformers that, one
hundred and fifty years after the British patent controversy, basic normative questions about the allocation of adjudicative authority between judge
and jury and the efficacy of expert tribunals remain unresolved. Claims
that modern patented technology is too complex for juries to comprehend
simply echo the claims of Webster, Hindmarch, and others from decades
ago. Perhaps these claims have been correct all along, and policymakers
have failed to fashion adequate responses. Perhaps, on the other hand, the
lesson is that the jury system is more resilient than we sometimes think,
and we should guard against overreacting to claims that particular new
technologies are too complex for lay juries.
B.

Natural Rights v. Utilitarianism

Patent abolitionism cut to the core of the patent system. It stimulated a
popular discussion over the fundamental philosophical justifications for
the patent grant, and in many ways anticipated twentieth century theoretical scholarship on justifications for the patent system, ranging from debates over natural rights justifications, to “incentive to disclose” and “incentive to invent” theories, reaching even to discussions of reward systems
versus property rights systems. As detailed below, the patent abolitionist
movement thus has made a substantial intellectual contribution to modern
patent law reform.129
1.

Natural Rights Justification

It was necessary for Macfie to rebut moral rights justifications for patents130 in order to present a convincing case for abolition of the patent system.131 Presumably unwilling to take on the entrenched Continental vision
of a moral rights justification for copyright, Macfie made his attack indiverdict questions “would merely confuse the jury and further complicate their task” and
asserting that “[t]he problem of submitting highly technical and complex questions—in
any fashion—to a lay jury remains a peculiar difficulty in patent cases”).
129. For recognition of this contribution, see Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The
Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1950). Scholarly
treatments of the patent abolitionist movement are rare, and, to my knowledge, Machlup
& Penrose is the only article to explore rigorously how pro- and anti-patent forces argued
fundamental justificatory theories of the patent system. I need not repeat their analysis
here; rather, in this brief section of the present article, I limit my analysis to a few pertinent observations, particularly on scholarly work that has been undertaken in the several
decades since the Machlup & Penrose work.
130. I.e., that version of a natural rights argument holding that society has a moral
obligation to recognize an inventor’s natural right in his or her invention.
131. Id. at 10 (articulating the moral rights argument); id. at 14 (noting that Macfie
was a “severe critic of the theory of natural property rights in inventions”).
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rectly, simply expounding at length on the inherent differences between
the creative arts—appropriately the objects of property under a natural
rights regime according to Macfie—and inventions—to which no claim of
property could be made merely as a matter of moral right. As Macfie
summarized the argument:
Those things that belong to the province of patent right are in
their nature capable of being independently discovered or originated, in the same identical form, by a plurality of persons . . . .
It is otherwise with things that belong to the province of copyright . . . .132

Advocates for the patent system, however, did not flock to the defense
of the moral rights justification. Although others attributed to him the
view,133 Webster did not defend the patent system on a pure moral rights
basis. Webster’s paper on the “Patent Right” argued:
[T]hat, of all acquired rights, that of an inventor to his own creation may be most truly called his own; his claims being that of
the first occupant, the foundation of all property. But when he
has given his invention to the world, the right to restrain others
from copying it is a matter of municipal regulation: in this country the grant of a patent is an act by grace of the crown, and it
may be made on such conditions as the crown chooses.134

This was a conventional approach distinguishing between undisclosed
ideas, which could belong to the idea holder as a matter of natural right,
and disclosed inventions, the grant of exclusive rights to which was a matter of “the grace of the crown,” and not of moral obligation.135 There has
been little effort since Webster and Macfie’s day to revive a pure moral
rights version of a natural rights justification for patents, particularly in the
United States, in the face of the instrumental ambitions expressed in the
U.S. Constitution.136 The abolitionist literature remains pertinent today as
132. Robert Andrew Macfie, The Patent Question, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE NAASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 818, 821 (George W.
Hastings ed., 1864).
133. Ringworth stated, in Patent Law, TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 884, 890 (George W. Hastings ed., 1863),
“I must enter my protest against the whole theory laid down. I differ from those who
think, like Mr. Webster, that there is any inherent right on the part of the inventor.”
134. Id. at 885.
135. Id.
136. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the progress of . . . useful arts”). Cf.
Adam Mossof, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History 15501800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001) (asserting that the natural rights justification played

TIONAL
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an expression of doubt as to the force of moral rights justifications for patent systems.
2.

Incentive to Disclose

Having discarded the moral rights justification for patents, the abolitionists moved on to address instrumental justifications.137 One of the
justifications discussed frequently during the course of the abolition
debate was whether, and to what extent, the patent grant provided an
incentive to disclose inventions. Webster, not surprisingly, employed the
disclosure function in defense of the patent system:
But as an inventor might, if he liked, keep his invention to himself, or practise it in secret, the object was to induce him to disclose it. If that system were done away with, then, instead of disclosure, we should have secret tribunals, of which we had now
forgotten the history.138

Macfie acknowledged the legitimacy of the disclosure function,139 but
wondered whether the patent system was really inducing it. He speculated
that many inventions, by their very nature, might be disclosed anyway
upon legitimate commercialization,140 and, of course, disclosure might be
a more significant role in the early development of patent systems than contemporary
scholars have acknowledged, and suggesting that natural rights arguments be accorded
some respect in modern patent policy debates).
137. For a summary of instrumental justifications for the patent right as articulated in
modern intellectual property theory, see, for example, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and
the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1017, 1024-30, 1036-44 (1989).
138. NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 1863, supra note 114, at 890. However, even Webster
recognized the limitations of the incentive to disclose theory. Testifying before the House
of Commons, he admitted that, “as a general rule, with reference to mechanical inventions, it is quite impossible” to maintain such inventions in secrecy because “the result
shows the means.” 2 MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS, supra note 98, at 335 (transcribing extracts from Commons’ Committee’s Report of 1871, Mr. Webster’s Evidence). Webster elaborated:
The power of secrecy must be limited, I think, to chemical patents in
this day. I do not think people can work much in closed rooms now-adays, and we should scarcely ever have such a case as that of Crumpton
of Nottingham making lace in a closed room, and people getting up to
the windows to find out the process. . . .
Id.
139. MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98, at 23 (“The expediency . . . may be
assumed of some means to stimulate the publishing or specifying of inventions.”).
140. This is one of several familiar objections to the incentive to disclose theory. See
Machlup & Penrose, supra note 129, at 26 (cataloguing objections to the incentive to
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extracted by less conventional means. In response to the question,
“[w]ould the absence of Patents for inventions, in your judgment, have
any effect in producing secret trades . . . ?,” Macfie quoted one commentator as answering, “I know this, that no trade can be kept secret long; a
quart of ale will do wonders in that way.”141 Scholars continue to debate
the extent to which patent systems induce disclosure, and it seems doubtful that any general answer is likely to emerge.
3.

Incentive to Invent

Webster articulated the now-familiar incentive theory under which the
patent grant supplies an incentive to invent, or invest in research and development, and an antidote to uncontrolled free-riding:
Who would go to the expense of making elaborate machines, of
which patterns could be taken by any other person the next day?
Without the patent laws, all these inventions could not subsist, as
men could not be found to go the expense of starting them.142

The abolitionist response to this justification for the patent system was
not especially satisfactory. Certainly, abolitionists would have experienced
difficulty mustering a convincing argument that the patent system had retarded the progress of innovation (or even reduced its rate of acceleration),
given the unprecedented flowering of technology in the course of the Industrial Revolution.143 So abolitionists generally conceded that the patent
system had induced innovation, but argued either that the patent reward
was disproportionate to the innovation induced, or that innovation was
“overstimulated,” apparently meaning that resources were being devoted
towards innovation in excess of some socially optimal level. One commentator who adopted this latter view used the U.S. patent system as an
example of the dangers of an overheated patent system:
In all her arrangements, Nature provides for a due equilibrium of
powers and tendencies . . . . But if . . . we give a factitious impulse to the inventive faculty, we destroy the natural equilibrium
of capacities, and foster a scheming, fanciful turn of mind, at the
expense of thoroughness and a patient working out of sound
disclose theory raised in the course of the abolitionist movement). Modern scholars have
voiced similar objections. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1028-29.
141. MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS, supra note 98, at 56 (quoting Richard Roberts).
142. NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 1863, supra note 114, at 890.
143. DUTTON, supra note 1, at 29 (noting that proponents of the patent system could
argue that the recent decades had witnessed remarkable technological expansion, all during a time when the patent system existed).
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ideas. This result has actually occurred in the United States,
where the factitious value attached to invention has tended to
produce an almost total sacrifice of solid workmanship to a
flimsy ingenuity.144

The arguments that the patent system offered disproportionate awards
seemed to have a firmer foundation, but seemed only to prove that reform
was needed, not abolition. For example, consider another Macfie argument:
Mr. Webster . . . told us that the theory of the patent law is that a
monopoly is given for a limited time, till the public are instructed
in the new manufacture or new method of manufacture. But the
misfortune is, that the patent retards the use by the public of
whatever is patented . . . . We must remember that, now-a-days,
the hindrance of fourteen years is very serious, so rapid is now
the race of competition.145

This argument is a familiar one today; economists have frequently asserted that the ex ante incentive structure of the patent system could be
fine-tuned by optimizing the patent term—not by throwing out patents altogether.146 Legislative efforts to revise the patent term, either in its absolute length or by starting the term at the earliest effective filing date (or
both), are legion, extending throughout the twentieth century, culminating
in the adoption of the twenty-year term in the United States, in compliance
with the TRIPs agreement.147 Modern scholars also recognize that the patent incentive can be optimized by careful attention to patent scope.148

144. MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS, supra note 98, at 119-20 (quoting from a presented paper of J. Stirling entitled “Patent Right”).
145. Is the Granting of Patents for Inventions Conducive to the Interests of Trade?, in
TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
661, 665 (George W. Hastings ed. 1865) [hereinafter NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 1865]. One
wonders how Macfie would have felt about the rapidity of the twenty-first century “race
of competition.”
146. See, e.g., Andrew W. Horowitz & Edwin L.-C. Rai, Patent Length and the Rate
of Innovation, 37 INT’L ECON. REV. 785 (1996).
147. For a review of relevant legislation, see STAFF OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG., EXPEDITING PATENT OFFICE PROCEDURE—A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 10-22
(Comm. Print 1960) (Margaret M. Conway, author) (discussing dozens of legislative proposals dating from 1875 to 1957 calling variously for term reductions or for terms of 20
years measured from the filing date); see also PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE PATENT
SYSTEM, REPORT TO THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH CONG., “TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF
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Macfie also argued that the incentive structure provided by the patent
system resulted in a profusion of patents. He offered what surely has now
become a classic businessperson’s lament:
In the manufacture with which I am connected—the sugar
trade—there are somewhere like 300 or 400 patents. Now, how
are we to know all these 400 patents? How are we to manage
continually, in the natural process of making improvements in
manufacture, to know which of these patents we are at any time
conflicting with? So far as I know, we are not violating any patent; but really, if we are to be exceedingly earnest in the question, probably we would require to have a highly paid clerk in
London continually analysing the various patents; and every
year, by the multiplication of patents, this difficulty is becoming
more formidable.149

One might well sympathize with Macfie on this point, but again the
answer was reform, rather than abolition. Given the lack of substantive
pre-grant examination, it is not surprising that the patent system of
Macfie’s day experienced a fundamental patent quality problem.150
. . . USEFUL ARTS” IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 33 (1967) (recommending a
20-year term measured from earliest effective filing date—Recommendation XVII).
Scholarly commentary on these and related proposals is voluminous. See, e.g.,
Arthur C. Fraser, Patent Law Reforms, 8 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 461, 468 (1925) (suggesting
20-year term); W. Houston Kenyon, Jr., Sore Spots in the Patent System, 24 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 458, 471-75 (1942) (suggesting patent term measured from application date); Bert
Russell, The Improvement of Our Patent System, 15 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 666 (1933) (suggesting 20 year term); George H. Willits, Proposed Patent Legislation: Why It Is Needed,
the Advantages of the Proposed Legislation and the Objections to It, 12 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 313, 392 (1930) (same).
Of course, this merely scratches the surface, leaving aside important issues such
as term extensions for pharmaceuticals. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 155-56 (Supp. 2001).
148. To cite one common proposal, scholars have expressed mounting interest in
more robust “fair use” or “experimental use” exceptions to infringement. See Mark D.
Janis, Sustainable Agriculture, Patent Rights, and Plant Innovation, IND. J. GLOBAL LEG.
STUD. n.51 (forthcoming 2002) (on file with author).
149. NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 1865, supra note 145, at 666. Macfie was apparently
fond of citing the 300-400 figure, including in testimony before the House of Commons.
One such instance drew a response from Webster: “The Honourable Member for Leith
[Macfie] made a notable admission, that out of 400 sugar patents, he was not aware of
any one being obstructive.” 2 MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS, supra note 98, at 334
(reproducing extracts from Commons’ Committee Report 1871, Mr. Webster’s Evidence).
150. Webster thought as much. Id. at 664. This is all quite apart from the larger question of whether a multiplicity of patents in a given art area is a bad thing at all for participants in that art area.
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Macfie endorsed yet another argument about skewed patent incentives
of interest to modern reformers. According to this argument, in the early
days of British patent grants, patent “monopolies” were tolerated (i.e.,
deemed to create monopolies, but not of the “odious” variety) because
craftsmen were so isolated, and communication so primitive, that government needed to provide a stimulus to ensure the introduction of new technologies to the realm. There was then a “wide open field to invention” and
a danger that innovations would be lost if not recorded by a centralized
authority.151 Because those conditions were no longer present, the argument continued, the patent system was no longer necessary.152
In one respect, this argument is consistent with what has now become
a longstanding tradition, in which commentators of any given era proclaim
that the patent system of their time was designed for the conditions of a
previous age, and should therefore be reviled as anachronistic and scuttled
or reformed. Learned Hand called the U.S. patent system of the 1930’s
“archaic;”153 in the 1940’s, Frankfurter declared the system “obsolete;”154

151. William Hawes, On the Economical Effects of the Patent Laws, in TRANSACNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 830, 833
(George W. Hastings ed., 1864).
152. See also MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98 at 37 (presenting the argument that England was willing to tolerate exclusive patent rights in order to stimulate the
development of new industries, but it was not foreseen that privileges would eventually
be granted in large numbers in areas where industry (domestic) was already well established).
153. Texas Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 87 F.2d 690, 693 (2d. Cir. 1937) (Hand, J.)
(“Courts have always discouraged efforts to dress up [minor] advances . . . as invention;
that discouragement was never more proper than at the present time, at least while the
patent law remains as archaic as it is.”).
In a similar vein, a 1930s-era reform commission, addressing the question of
whether a system of compulsory licensing should be introduced into U.S. patent law,
observed:
There has been enormous change in technique and commercial practice
in the last hundred years. The patent system at its inception contemplated an individual inventor, given a monopoly for 17 years as a reward and stimulant for invention, and to enable funds to be obtained
from commercialization. This simple situation no longer obtains. What
was originally a self- sufficient patent to an individual for 17 years has
developed into a patent structure or assemblage of patents, giving a
substantially permanent monopoly in an advancing art to an industry or
a group of industries. The justification for the extension in a democratic
country of an absolute monopoly to an invention, in lieu of maintaining
it secret, no longer applies generally.
Science Advisory Board, Report of the Committee on the Relation of the Patent System to
the Stimulation of New Industries, reprinted in 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 94, 103 (1936).
TIONS OF THE
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in the mid-1950’s, the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights reported that the patent system needed to be “adjusted to modern conditions;”155 in the later 1950’s, Professor Melman asserted that the
patent system was so “obsolete” that it no longer was fulfilling its Constitutional purpose to promote progress in the useful arts,156 sparking a spirited response from the patent bar.157
The obsolescence argument offered in the British patent controversy is
also ironic when juxtaposed against modern arguments on international
154. Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter noted:
I have little doubt, in so far as I am entitled to express an opinion, that
the vast transforming forces of technology have rendered obsolete
much in our patent law. For all I know the basic assumption of our patent law may be false, and inventors and their financial backers do not
need the incentive of a limited monopoly to stimulate invention.
155. REVIEW OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 71, at 1. As the report
proceeded to explain:
When the patent laws were first drawn, invention and discovery were
almost exclusively the product of the efforts of individuals working
alone. Today, invention and discovery are largely the work of research
laboratories. . . .
Id.
156. STAFF OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., THE IMPACT OF THE PATENT
SYSTEM ON RESEARCH 57 (Comm. Print 1958) (Seymour Melman, author). Melman reasoned that “changes in the ways of producing knowledge,” among other factors, resulted
in the patent system having “lost the effectiveness that it may once have had as a way of
promoting science and the useful arts.” Id.; see also id. at 62 (declaring that the patent
system no longer served its Constitutional purpose).
Melman did not make clear whether he supported the outright abolition of the
patent system, however. Certainly he seemed dismissive of the notion that any modest
reforms could restore the usefulness of the patent system:
The effort to operate a patent system formulated for the technological
conditions of a century ago has proved to be increasingly awkward.
The problems of patent-system operation, however, do not stem primarily from the administrative shortcomings or from the absence of ingenuity among the able attorneys, judges, and Patent Office staffs who
administer the system. Rather, they stem from the inability to apply the
conceptions of a bygone era to the contemporary conditions under
which technical knowledge is produced.
Id. at 61-62.
157. Patent Law Association of Los Angeles, Our Patent System Works: A Reply to
the Melman Report, 42 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 295 (1960). The authors also questioned
whether it was accurate to draw such a sharp distinction between modes of invention in
the nineteenth century and the twentieth, discounting “the romanticized and largely
fictionized [sic] picture of the struggling inventor of the past century, alone in his garret
with his experiments.” Id. at 304.
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patent policy. Macfie proposed that, while the patent system succeeded in
stimulating progress in the early, developing British economy, it thwarted
progress later, when Britain’s economy had a developed industrial base.
Today, some scholars take precisely the opposite position: that fullfledged patent systems may benefit developed economies but may be
counterproductive when transplanted into developing economies (e.g., to
satisfy TRIPs obligations.158
4.

Reward Systems

Perhaps of greatest interest to modern scholars is Macfie’s proposed
alternative to the patent system: a reward system administered by the
government, paying a subsidy, sometimes in a predetermined amount, directly to the inventor rather than awarding property rights and allowing the
inventor to collect license fees. According to Macfie, a reward system
would be “on the whole, wise and fair,” as a substitute for “monopoly”
patent rights; indeed, it would provide superior ex ante incentives because
the reward, unlike royalties under a patent license, “is prompt and is sure;
the bird is in the hand.”159
Reward systems substitute the complexities of substantive patent examination with the complexities of calculating an optimal award amount.
Perhaps the weakest aspect of Macfie’s reward argument was his failure to
articulate a viable formula for calculating appropriate awards. Macfie
gives little reassurance in providing simply that the reward payment would
be calculated not in accordance with the amount that a patentee might extract by way of license fees if exclusive rights were granted, but rather by
“what is fair, considering utility, cost of preliminary trials, originality,
probability of others making the same discovery, &c.”160
Macfie also offered an alternative proposal that combined notions of
exclusive rights, compulsory licensing, and a reward system. Under this
158. See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPs—Natural Rights and a “Polite” Form of Economic Imperialism, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 415 (1996).
159. MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98, at 24-25. Macfie’s invocation of
wisdom and fairness might suggest to some that his reward proposal was not based purely
on utilitarian concerns. It is plausible to propose that Macfie would have agreed even
with a normative version of Lockean labor theory (i.e., that an inventor should receive
rewards for his labor), but would simply have argued that the patent system provided too
generous a reward (i.e., a greater reward than the concerns of justice would have dictated). See Machlup & Penrose, supra note 129, at 17-19 (describing views of various
anti-patent advocates on the labor-reward theory); see generally Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296-329 (1988) (thorough exploration
of the Lockean labor-reward theory for various forms of intellectual property).
160. MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98, at 41.




3$7(17$%2/,7,21,60





proposal, a patentee would enjoy exclusive rights, subject to compulsory
licensing, for a term of three years from grant, after which the government
would undertake a “valuation” and subsequently pay the patentee in accord with the calculated value, after which any patent rights would cease.
Under a further alternative, the government would have the option of undertaking the valuation at a later time.161
John Stuart Mill provided the standard economic argument in response
to simple reward system proposals: patent rights should be superior to a
simple reward system because under a patent system, the market, through
payment of license fees, determines the amount of the reward.162 Webster
added that patented technology often did not come into general use until
more than three years had passed, such that Macfie’s valuation scheme
might not be practicable.163
Curiously, Webster ultimately expressed tentative agreement with
Macfie’s optional reward scheme, at least insofar as it relied upon the
principle of compulsory licensing. Foreshadowing a debate that continues
to the present day, Webster clearly favored the aggressive use of compulsory licensing schemes to curb potential abuses of patent rights.164
Theoretical analysis as to the efficacy of reward systems continues in
scholarly circles today.165 Indeed, given the definitive political failure of
the abolitionist movement by the late 1870’s, Macfie might be pleasantly
surprised at the extent to which his writings continue to inform modern
scholarly debate. In their recent study of the economics of reward systems,
Shavell and Ypersele cite Macfie’s work to illustrate the historical precedent for reward system proposals and the basic outlines of those proposals.166 Shavell and Ypersele develop an economic model to test whether
patent systems are superior, from a social welfare standpoint, to either
pure reward systems or an optional system in which the innovator chooses
between the patent grant and the reward grant. While they are unable to
prove that pure reward systems are unambiguously superior to patent sys161. Macfie, The Patent Question, supra note 132, at 829.
162. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 129, at 20 (quoting Mill). Scholars have now
elaborated on these simplified propositions. See text accompanying notes 166-171 infra.
163. NAPSS 1863 TRANSACTIONS, supra note 114, at 885.
164. See, e.g., NAPSS 1863 TRANSACTIONS, supra note 114, at 885; NAPSS 1865
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 145, at 664.
165. See generally Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes (Soc. Sci. Researh
Network, Law & Economics Working Paper Series), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=292079 (last visited Jan. 4. 2002); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 705-17 (2000) (critiquing
prize proposals); Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 8.
166. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 8, at 526-27.
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tems,167 they conclude that optional reward systems would outperform a
patent system,168 even under circumstances where the government’s information relevant to calculation of the reward is relatively poor.169
Others have pointed out practical and theoretical limitations of the
Shavell and Ypersele model,170 but it is not my object to propose a resolution on the merits of this debate. It is remarkable, however, that the arguments of a Victorian-era British sugar refiner retain relevance in twentyfirst century law and economics scholarship on patent theory.
C.

Harmonization or Abolition? Patents and the Interface with
Free Trade

While it may be that Robert Macfie held firm in his belief in the theoretical arguments he raised in support of abolishing the patent system, his
motivation for pressing so aggressively for abolition seems to have sprung
in no small part from pragmatic business considerations. Macfie was a
domestic sugar refiner, an occupation that required an understanding of
international competitiveness, even in the Victorian era. Of particular concern to Macfie was the impact of British patent rights on competition in
the trans-Atlantic sugar trade, especially competition between domestic
sugar refiners and colonial producers in the British West Indies.171 Macfie
generalized this narrow and self-serving claim into a variety of patent proposals linking patent rights to free trade and exploring international patent
law harmonization, as discussed in the subsections below.
167. Id. at 530. They conclude that a patent system could be superior to a reward system, because the patent system “effectively harnesses the private information of the innovator about the value of an innovation,” but that the reward system could also be superior
to the patent system, because the incentive to innovate is optimized (assuming that the
reward equals the actual social surplus afforded by the invention) and there is no monopoly pricing, and hence no deadweight loss due to such pricing. Thus, no general argument
favoring one system over the other can be made.
168. Id. at 530-31 (an optional reward system is “unambiguously” superior to patents
because expected social welfare is improved when the innovator chooses the reward (e.g.,
by avoiding deadweight loss associated with monopoly pricing)).
169. Id. at 541.
170. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 165, at 17-25. Like Shavell and Ypersele,
Abramowicz also makes reference to Macfie’s early arguments in support of a reward
system. Id. at 4 n.14.
171. For background on the nineteenth century sugar trade, see generally R. W.
BEACHEY, THE BRITISH WEST INDIES SUGAR INDUSTRY IN THE LATE 19TH CENTURY 4060 (1957) (describing the sugar trade and the Continental sugar bounty system); see also
S.N. BROADBERRY, THE PRODUCTIVITY RACE: BRITISH MANUFACTURING IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 1850-1990, 200 (1997) (discussing briefly the fall of the British
sugar refining industry in the 1880s, in the context of the international competitiveness of
British industry overall).
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Free Trade

Free trade principles172 probably formed the “main ideological influence” behind the abolitionist movement.173 Although anti-patent sentiment
drew from a variety of motivations, it is clear that free trade was a recurring theme, even finding its way into the title of one of Macfie’s numerous
abolitionist tracts.174
The free trade element of the abolitionist movement traces at
least as far back as the debates over passage of the 1852 Act.175
Patent reform proponents argued that the British patent right
should extend not only across England, Scotland, and Ireland,176
but also to British colonies. The principal advocates for this reform were domestic British sugar refiners, including Macfie,
who took the view that domestic refiners were, in effect, “taxed”
by the patent system, while West Indies refiners could operate
free of it and compete in British domestic markets.177

172. Concerning the free trade movement generally, see, for example, ANTHONY
HOWE, FREE TRADE AND LIBERAL ENGLAND 1846-1946 chs. 3-5 (1997); Oliver Macdonagh, The Anti-Imperialism of Free Trade, 14 ECON. HIST. REV. 489, 490-93 (1962)
(defining free trade by explaining its political context). On the rise of protectionism in
Britain in the late 1870s, see, for example, BENJAMIN H. BROWN, THE TARIFF REFORM
MOVEMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN 1881-1895, at 9-28 (1943).
173. DUTTON, supra note 1, at 24.
174. See MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98.
175. See WEBSTER, supra note 16 (referring to the 1852 Act).
176. See WEBSTER, supra note 16, at 3 (reporting that some considered the 1835 Act
insufficient for its failure to institute a patent that extended across England, Scotland, and
Ireland).
177. See COULTER, supra note 14, at 59-60 (reporting the views of sugar refiners).
Moreover, whereas one might expect that the domestic disadvantages of this “tax” could
be alleviated by the imposition of import duties on foreign or colonial refiners, Great
Britain had eliminated the sugar bounty system under the principle of free trade. Id. at
169-71 (explaining briefly the bounty system). Macfie argued:
Inventions, which are made the subject of patent in this country, very
soon become known in other countries, and not many weeks elapse before other countries adopt what is detailed in the specifications of Great
Britain. The result, therefore, is that while we British manufacturers
stand with our arms folded, waiting till the expiration of the fourteen
years, our rivals abroad do or may at once step in, use the inventions,
and compete with us in our own markets; at any rate, they get too frequently the use of inventions free, for which we alone pay, or are expected to pay, the inventors’ rewards.
NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 1865, supra note 145, at 666 (reporting comments of Macfie).
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Ultimately, the sugar refiners failed: the 1852 Act did not extend the
patent right to British colonies.178 But Macfie had his argument, and was
more than willing to advance it in the name of patent abolition.179
In addition, from Macfie’s perspective, the free trade argument grew
stronger in the course of the 1860’s because the disharmony among the
patent laws of key European nations became more acute. In particular,
Holland had abolished its patent system in 1869; Switzerland had no patent system; and France, Germany, and Belgium were all engaged in abolitionist debates.180 The prospect of competition from Continental manufacturers operating free of any patent rights certainly would have added to
Macfie’s sense of urgency to remove the “crying evil” brought about by
the patent system.181
Contemporary commentators disagreed on whether the anti-patent argument in fact reflected a proper interpretation of free trade principles.
One of the major detractors was John Stuart Mill, who expressed “real
alarm” that if the anti-patent movement succeeded, it would “enthrone free
stealing under the prostituted name of free trade.”182 But aside from theoretical objections, Macfie’s free trade argument were met by pragmatic
rejoinders. Webster supplied two.
One of Webster’s rejoinders was an economic argument: even if the
domestic producer was forced to pay the “tax” in the form of patent license fees, the domestic producer received in exchange the benefit of the
invention, which presumably was equal to or in excess of the license fee;
otherwise, the producer would decline to adopt the patented technology.183
178. Nor did this view prevail in debates that led to passage of the 1883 Act after the
abolitionist movement had subsided. COULTER, supra note 14, at 167.
179. Id. at 72 (suggesting that although the 1852 reform effort failed, one result was
the emergence of Robert Macfie as a leader in the burgeoning patent abolitionist movement).
180. See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 1, at 29 (“The fact that Switzerland and Holland
had abolished their patent systems in 1863 and 1869 gave the British movement an impetus which it never previously had.”); COULTER, supra note 14, at 90. Macfie’s compilations include numerous “extracts” from Dutch, French, German, and Belgian commentators and officials. See, e.g., MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS, supra note 98, at 185 (relaying official communication from Count Von Bismarck to the North German Parliament);
id. at 164-180 (transcribing discussions in France); id. at 197-229 (transcribing discussions in Holland).
181. MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98, at 33.
182. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 129, at 9 n.32 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 932 (1872)).
183. Macfie and Webster argue the point in 2 MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS,
supra note 98 (reproducing extracts from Commons’ Committee’s Report of 1871, Mr.
Webster’s Evidence):
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Another rejoinder revealed that Macfie’s argument rested on a mistaken
assumption as to the state of the law of infringement—although, in
Macfie’s defense, the law had apparently changed in the course of the abolitionist debate, as reflected in the following exchange:
Macfie:

[When England, Scotland, and Ireland had separate
patent systems,] monopoly having been granted in
England, but not in Scotland or Ireland, there was
nothing then to prevent an English consumer, notwithstanding the monopoly in England, from being
supplied from Scotland and from Ireland, with articles made according to the invention in those two
countries. . .[and] there was no restriction on importation into England of articles manufactured free of
patents in the two sister countries, was there?

Webster:

[answering no, acknowledging a theoretical problem
but doubting whether the problem ever in fact manifested itself]

Macfie:

Then under free trade, that which was formerly done
as between Scotland and Ireland, on the one hand,
and England, on the other, is being regularly done as
between any foreign countries that have not patents
and the whole of the British Islands, is it not?

Webster:

Yes; no doubt.

Macfie:

So that an article patented in this country can be
manufactured in Switzerland [where no patent sys-

Macfie: [T]ake the sugar manufacture, a manufacture which is carried
on upon the same principle, and for the same markets, in the
colonies and in the United Kingdom; [the non-uniformity of
patent rights] tended to make manufacturers of sugar in one
part of the empire gain advantages on the one hand, or bear
burdens on the other hand, that their competitors, also subjects of the Queen, were not partakers of or liable to?
Webster: No doubt, theoretically that was so; but I take it that the
advantage derived from the succession of improvements was
such that that would disappear, and that sugar can be made at
Liverpool or Leith quite as cheaply as anywhere in the colonies by reason of the subsequent improvements.
Id. at 339.
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tem existed] or Holland [which had abolished its
patent system], and sent to this country?
Webster:

Yes.

Macfie:

But would the law prohibit the sale in this country of
articles made in those two countries according to the
principles of any patents existing in this country?

Webster:

Yes; that has been decided, within the last month, by
the House of Lords. That is assuming that they were
proved to be made according to the system that was
patented in this country.184

These exchanges suggest that Macfie’s effort to turn free trade principles to the cause of patent abolitionism may have failed on their own merits. Regardless, events ensuing a short time after this exchange demonstrated that Macfie made a strategic error when he linked the anti-patent
movement to free trade. The British economy slid into depression, reviving protectionist impulses at the expense of free trade policies. By 1874,
much had changed, including the British domestic political scene. Macfie
lost his seat in the House of Commons, and the abolitionist movement lost
its place in the domestic political agenda.
Despite its failure, Macfie’s free trade argument was, in one respect,
ahead of its time—it sought to link international trade policy with national
patent policy. Macfie, representing a business concern based in an advanced economy and operating in an internationally-competitive market,
argued on the basis of free-trade principles that the absence of patent systems in some countries (countries capable of participating in the export
trade, but not necessarily having developed economies) gave those countries an advantage. Accordingly, he asserted that patents should be abolished. Perhaps he would have thought it an ironic twist that in the late
twentieth century, global business concerns in developing economies saw
the absence of patent systems in some developing countries as antithetical

184. Id. at 341-42 (reproducing extracts from Commons’ Committee’s Report of
1871, Mr. Webster’s Evidence). Having apparently received the wrong answer, Macfie
changed the issue, shifting to questions about the difficulty of proving that a product imported into Britain had been manufactured overseas using a British patented process. The
current U.S. patent statute reflects similar concerns. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (Supp. 2001)
(liability for importation of products made by patented processes); id. § 295 (presumption
that product was made by patented process).
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to international trade, and suggested that patent systems meeting TRIPs
minimum standards be established.
2.

International Patent Harmonization

As noted above, Macfie perceived that variations among patent regimes, from country to country, had the potential to impose unfair “taxes”
on domestic industry in those countries where patent rights had to be respected, and thus Macfie saw patent systems as obstructing “free trade.”
While Macfie’s favored solution was to abolish patent systems where they
existed, it was not his only proposal. Macfie appeared to recognize that if
lack of uniformity among patent laws created the problem, harmonization
(or unification) of patent laws provided one solution:
How inconvenient and hurtful, to inventors and to the public, is
the diversity of laws now prevailing! How great a facility to inventors, if a Patent registered in one country were recognised in
all others; and to both inventors and manufacturers, if a specification published in one were made officially known in all.185

Macfie proposed as much, although only as an alternative to outright
abolition, and seemingly with considerably less vigor. Macfie’s proposal
was a utopian one: he called, as so many others have in succeeding years,
for a patent of world-wide effect, apparently contemplating not merely
harmonized national laws but a truly unified international system.186 Even
then, Macfie recognized that it was probably “vain to hope that the countries of Europe and America, with their colonies, will speedily agree to an
international system,”187 and so pressed his reward system as a more viable alternative.188
185. MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98, at 32. Macfie also reported on others’ arguments for harmonization-related reforms—for example, Michel Chevalier’s argument that the scope of the prior art should extend worldwide. Chevalier asserted that
the scope of prior art should reach “even to the antipodes,” explaining, with startling prescience, that in some far-flung “young communities” such as California, “[i]nventive
genius is very active and very well-directed.” MACFIE, PATENT QUESTION, supra note 98,
at 57 (translation of M. Michel Chevalier on the Law of Patents, taken from the introduction to the Rapports des Membres de la Section Francaise du Jury International sur
l’ensemble de l’Exposition, 1862). .
186. NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 1863, supra note 114, at 884 (reporting on Macfie’s
paper, Patents Internationally Considered).
187. He probably had no idea how correct he was. Although interest in substantive
patent law harmonization again seems to be on the rise, efforts to create a Community
patent regime have again stalled. See Results of the Internal Market Council Brussels,
Community Patent, MEMO/01/4510 (Dec. 12, 2001), at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=MEMO/01/451|0|RAPID&lg=EN&d
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In another of many ironies, the patent abolitionist movement had very
direct consequences for the international patent harmonization agenda. At
the very time when “the controversy between patent and anti-patent forces
throughout Europe was still bitter,”189 plans for the International Exposition at Vienna in 1873 generated pressure for international patent cooperation, and ultimately led to the first international conference on patents, the
Vienna Patent Congress of 1873. Some 158 participants from 13 countries,
including the United States, Britain, and several countries from the Continent, gathered at the Congress.190
Webster participated in the Vienna Congress, and was elected a Vice
President (along with five others), a member of the Executive Committee,
and, after the Congress, a member of an unofficial British committee
formed to explore further cooperative efforts with the Executive Committee.191 Macfie submitted his views to the Congress by letter.192 Participants
at the Congress endorsed patent protection in principle, and resolved to
press ahead to create an international treaty on patents.193 The Congress
also endorsed the principle of compulsory licensing.194 Webster, an advocate of compulsory licensing despite his general support for the patent system, defended this principle “warmly.”195 The influence of the patent
abolitionist debate was clear.196 The patent abolitionist movement
subsided, but the international patent movement took hold, maintaining
discourse about many of the concerns promulgated by the patent
abolitionists.197 Discussions at the Vienna Patent Congress led to further
isplay= (last visited Dec. 22, 2001) (reporting the most recent failure of the EU’s Council
of Internal Market Ministers to reach agreement on proposals that would create a Community Patent).
188. NAPSS TRANSACTIONS 1863, supra note 114, at 884.
189. EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 46 (1951).
190. Id. (noting that despite the impressive attendance, the conference was not an
official diplomatic conference).
191. COULTER, supra note 14, at 174-76.
192. 2 MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS, supra note 98, at 141-47 (reproducing
extracts from Webster’s Report to the Royal Commission of the Vienna Universal Exhibition, 1873).
193. PENROSE, supra note 189, at 46-48.
194. 2 MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS, supra note 98, at 147 (reproducing extracts from Webster’s Report to the Royal Commission of the Vienna Universal Exhibition, 1873).
195. Id.
196. PENROSE, supra note 189, at 47 (crediting the anti-patent movement with creating awareness of the potential abuses of the patent system, and thereby facilitating acceptance of the principle of compulsory licensing).
197. Coulter reports that both anti-patent and pro-patent forces approved of the agreements made in Vienna; the anti-patent forces saw at least the prospect of eliminating the
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Discussions at the Vienna Patent Congress led to further discussions in
Paris; and in 1883, several nations signed the Paris Convention, regarded
as the first international patent treaty.198
IV.

CONCLUSION: PATENT LAW REFORM AND THE
PATENT LAW REFORMATORY

Despite the fundamental differences between the patent systems of
nineteenth century Britain and those of the modern-day United States,
many of the significant elements of the modern patent law reform agenda
have antecedents in British patent abolitionism. The abolitionism literature
therefore can, and should, inform modern patent reform debate in the
United States. First, modern reform proponents who seek to invoke core
arguments about the limitations of juries, or the efficacy of expert tribunals, in patent litigation; the foundational justifications for systems of exclusive property rights as compared to reward systems; or the notion that
domestic patent policy interacts with considerations of global trade, can
find the positions staked out with clarity in the abolitionism literature.
Even arguments about Congressional diversion of PTO surplus fees have
nineteenth century British counterparts.199
the disharmony in patent protection, easing their concerns over unfair advantages in international trade. COULTER, supra note 14, at 176.
198. For an account of the origins of the Paris Convention, see STEPHEN P. LADAS, 1
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION ch. 4 (1975); see also COULTER, supra note 14, at 176-80.
199. For an argument about fee diversion in the nineteenth century British patent
system, see MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS, supra note 98, at 378, reproducing extracts from Commons’ Committee’s Report of 1871, Mr. Webster’s Evidence:
[T]here is a surplus fund of £60,000 a year, which we call the Inventors’ Fee Fund, and there is the accumulative fund of £750,000 more
than that, accumulating at the rate of £50,000 or £60,000 a year, which
I say is inventors’ money, and ought not to go into the Consolidated
Fund. I say let the inventor have the benefit of it in the shape of a
proper Patent Office . . . .
For a sample of recent discussions on the fee diversion issue in the U.S., see, for
example, Union Chief Assails Diversion of PTO Fees, 61 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 600 (2001), noting that President Bush’s PTO budget proposal diverts a
record $207 million and that H.R. 110 has been introduced in an attempt to curb annual
fee diversion; New Bills Would Implement Madrid Protocol, Curb PTO Fee Diversion,
61 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 420 (2001), discussing the introduction of
H.R. 740 which would prevent future fee diversion; PTO Funding Falls Short of Goal
Sought by Senate, 61 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 7 (2000), stating that
H.R. 4942 withholds $161 million from PTO's estimated income and is diverting the fee
income to other general programs; Panel Approves PTO Funding Bill with Fee Diversion, 60 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 122 (2000), noting that the House
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Second, those of us who dabble in U.S. patent law reform might take
away from the abolitionism literature a general lesson in humility. As frequently as we may invoke the exigencies of new technology and new economic circumstances as motivation for patent law reform, many of our reform proposals return to decidedly old themes. In 1894, one commentator,
writing in the Yale Law Journal, outlined the three major defects of the
then-existing U.S. patent system: “[f]irst, that there is little reliance to be
placed on the patent itself; second, that the time which it takes to carry on
a suit to enforce any patent rights is great; and third, that the expense of
such litigation is enormous.”200 According to the author, several reform
measures ought to be taken in view of these complaints, including arriving
at a satisfactory definition of the standard of “invention,” and incorporating an inter partes element to the ex parte examination system.201
The Yale Law Journal paper could have been written at nearly any
point in the twentieth century. Among some serious scholars, its core observations would still ring true today. Indeed, in 2000, John Barton wrote
a brief article in Science entitled, “Reforming the Patent System.”202 He
advocated reform of the nonobviousness standard and weakening of the
presumption of validity,203 and incorporation of a more robust inter partes
reexamination scheme into U.S. law.204
The Roosevelt administration in both the 1930s205 and 1940s,206 the
Johnson administration in the 1960s,207 and the Bush administration in the
Judiciary Committee has approved H.R. 4034, which would end the yearly diversion of
fees, but that such legislation is unlikely to be enacted.
200. Brewer, supra note 9, at 149.
201. The author also would have limited or even barred the use of expert testimony
in patent litigation. Id. at 155 (recounting complaints that such experts might charge sums
as outrageous as $50 per day). The author rejected suggestions that the term of the patent
be severely limited, to ten years, as Congress was then considering. Id. at 150 (discussing
the relevant legislation).
202. John H. Barton, Intellectual Property Rights: Reforming the Patent System, 287
SCIENCE 1933 (2000).
203. Id. at 1933.
204. Id. at 1934. Professor Barton also suggested that “broad basic patents on
fundamental research processes” might deter follow-on research, and could be subjected
to a compulsory licensing regime. Id. at 1933-34.
205. Science Advisory Board, Report of the Committee on the Relation of the Patent
System to the Stimulation of New Industries, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 94 (1936). The Science Advisory Board formed the Committee in response to a request from the Secretary
of Commerce “for a broad policy program for the stimulation of new industries in this
country.” Id. at 94. Vannevar Bush, then Dean of Engineering at MIT, chaired the Committee, which was composed primarily of representatives from large corporations. Id.
206. THE NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING COMMISSION, 78th CONG., THE AMERICAN
PATENT SYSTEM: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING COMMISSION (1943),
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early 1990s208 all ordered special commissions to study patent law reform.209 The table below illustrates the common themes among reform
commissions over the decades,210 reflecting a high level of congruence
with the reform themes of the British patent abolitionist movement.

Reform
Proposal

Committee on
the Relation
of the Patent
System to the
Stimulation of
New Industries (1936)

National Patent Planning
Commission
(1943)

Reform of
Obviousness
Standard;
Presumption of
Validity

Recommended

Recommended

Opposition/
Revocation
Pre-Grant
Publication
Single Appellate
Patent Court

President’s
Commission
on the Patent
System
(1967)

Advisory
Commission
on Patent
Law
Reform
(1992)

Considered &
rejected

Recommended
ex parte preand post-grant

Recommended
reform

Recommended

Not considered

Recommended

Recommended

Recommended

Recommended

N/A

reprinted in 25 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 456 (1943). President Roosevelt established the
Commission by executive order.
207. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, REPORT TO THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
90TH CONG., “TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF . . . USEFUL ARTS” IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY, S. Doc. No. 5 (Feb. 2, 1967). President Johnson established the Commission in 1965. Id. at ii. The Commission included public members as well as representatives from the Departments of Commerce and Defense, and the Small Business Administration and the National Science Foundation. Id. at iv.
208. THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE (1992). The Secretary of Commerce established the Advisory
Commission in 1990. Members included lawyers, administrators from academia, and
corporate executives. Id. at 5. The representative from the Association of University
Technology Managers declined to sign the final report. Id. at iii.
209. In addition, Congress commissioned a series of studies on the patent system in
the late 1950's. Several of those studies are cited in this article. See, e.g., supra notes 7,
37, 123, 156 and accompanying text.
210. I have not included each reform suggested in each commission report. Where I
have left a blank, the commission did not report any recommendations on the topic.
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Patent Trial
Courts

Compulsory
Licensing
20-year Term

Recommended
the use of
technical
advisors

Considered &
rejected



Recommended
the use of
“Civil Commissioners”

Recommended

Recommended

Recommended

Recommended

Recommended

Considered
w/o
recommendation
Recommended

First-to-File

Obviously, these isolated examples of scholarship, and of reform commission publications, do not alone support a broad claim that U.S. patent
law reform over the past century has been an exercise in reiteration; but it
seems worthwhile to ask a few hard questions about the content of the
patent law reform agenda. Are these repeated themes of twentieth century
U.S. patent law reform simply the inevitable themes of any patent law
reform? Or have we become imprisoned in a kind of patent law reformatory, in which patent law reform is little more than a repackaging of old
debates?
This last query presents an important set of questions about the nature
of the patent law reform process generally. Reflecting on the patent abolitionism literature and subsequent U.S. patent law reform efforts through
1950, Machlup and Penrose conclude, rather tartly, that “little, if anything,
has been said for or against the patent system in the twentieth century that
was not said equally well in the nineteenth.”211 Perhaps some would hold
this up as the ultimate moral of the patent abolitionism story: abolitionism
failed, patent law reform ever since then has stagnated, and a perpetual
intellectual malaise has settled over the process.
I am attracted to a more optimistic bottom line. Batzel argues that, in
the face of radical “solutions” and theoretical arguments offered in the
abolitionist debate, the patent system survived because reformers pushed
“pragmatic administrative reforms”212 that strengthened the credibility of
the patent system. The process became one of reciprocal adjustment at an
incremental level; as the patent system reformed, attitudes about the patent
system adjusted. “Custom and a growing sense of traditional practice”
were “solidifying the place of patents in industrial England.”213 The his211. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 129, at 10.
212. Batzel, supra note 96, at 198.
213. Id. at 199.
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tory of the British abolitionism movement should give pause to current
U.S. patent policymakers. It should temper our enthusiasm for dramatic
patent law reform through legislation, and encourage healthy skepticism
about proposals that, when viewed in historical context, merely repackage
century-old debates.

